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This Article explores the relationship between the First Amendment and criminal procedure.  
These two domains of constitutional law have long existed as separate worlds, rarely 
interacting with each other despite the fact that many instances of government information 
gathering can implicate First Amendment freedoms of speech, association, and religion.  
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments used to provide considerable protection for First 
Amendment interests, as in the famous 1886 case Boyd v. United States, in which the 
Supreme Court held that the government was prohibited from seizing a person’s private 
papers.  Over time, however, Fourth and Fifth Amendment protection has shifted, and 
countless searches and seizures involving people’s private papers, the books they read, the 
websites they surf, and the pen names they use when writing anonymously now fall 
completely outside the protection of constitutional criminal procedure.  Professor Solove 
argues that the First Amendment should protect against government information gathering 
that implicates First Amendment interests.  He contends that there are doctrinal, historical, 
and normative justifications for developing what he calls “First Amendment criminal 
procedure.”  Solove sets forth an approach for determining when certain instances of 
government information gathering fall within the regulatory domain of the First Amendment 
and what level of protection the First Amendment should provide. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Suppose the government is interested in finding out about your 
political beliefs, religion, reading habits, or the things you write and say 
to others.  To uncover this information, law enforcement officials 
construct a bibliography of the books you read using records at 
bookstores and libraries.  They assemble a list of people with whom you 
communicate using records obtained from your Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) and phone company.  They seize your diary and personal 
writings.  To what extent do the Fourth and Fifth Amendments restrict 
the government’s investigation? 
In many instances, not at all.  A century ago, the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments would have significantly restricted government informa-
tion  
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tion gathering that involves what I will refer to as “First Amendment
activities”—speech, association, consumption of ideas, political
activity, religion, and journalism.1  But today, the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments play a much diminished role in these contexts.  First, the
Supreme Court has held that the use of a subpoena to obtain docu-
ments and testimony receives little, if any, Fourth or Fifth Amend-
ment protection.2  Subpoenas are orders compelling the production of
documents or information.  They are issued without judicial approval,
and they have few limitations beyond a requirement that the informa-
tion be relevant to an investigation.3  As a result, the government can
readily use subpoenas to gather information pertaining to communica-
tions, writings, and the consumption of ideas.  Second, the Court has
held that the Fourth Amendment does not cover instances when a
person’s information is gathered from third parties.4  In the Informa-
tion Age, a massive amount of data about our lives—data that may
pertain to First Amendment activities—is maintained by third-party
businesses and organizations.
Does the First Amendment provide any protection?  At first
blush, the question seems odd.  The rules that regulate government
investigations have typically emerged from the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, not the First.  Lawyers and judges generally do not
think of the First Amendment as having much relevance to criminal
procedure, let alone as providing its own criminal procedure rules.
The First Amendment is usually taught separately from the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments, and judicial decisions on criminal procedure
only occasionally mention the First Amendment.  I contend in this
Article, however, that the First Amendment must be considered
alongside the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as a source of criminal
procedure.
First Amendment activities are implicated by a wide array of law
enforcement data-gathering activities.  Government information gath-
ering about computer and Internet use, for example, can intrude on a
1 The First Amendment provides:  “Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) (holding that use of subpoena to
obtain records from third party does not violate Fifth Amendment privilege of person
under investigation); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973) (holding that sub-
poenas are not searches under Fourth Amendment).
3 See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:  TECHNOLOGY AND PRI-
VACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 202–03 (2004) (describing subpoenas and contrasting
them with warrants).
4 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
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significant amount of First Amendment activity.  Searching or seizing
a computer can reveal personal and political writings.  Obtaining e-
mail can provide extensive information about correspondence and
associations.  Similarly, ISP records often contain information about
speech, as they can link people to their anonymous communications.
AOL, for example, receives about a thousand requests per month for
use of its customer records in criminal cases.5
The government can also use subpoenas to gather information
about First Amendment activities such as book reading and personal
writing.  Indeed, the FBI once subpoenaed six years of customer
records from Arundel Books, an alternative book retailer, in connec-
tion with an investigation of political campaign contributions.6
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed records of
Kramerbooks & Afterwords, a bookstore in Washington, D.C.,
regarding books Monica Lewinsky purchased for President Bill
Clinton.7  The government has also subpoenaed people’s writings,
documents, and even their diaries.  The Senate Ethics Committee, for
example, subpoenaed the diaries of Republican Senator Bob
Packwood as part of its investigation of sexual harassment charges
against the senator.8
Government information gathering can also implicate other First
Amendment protections, such as freedom of association and freedom
of the press.  Freedom of association can be implicated when the gov-
ernment monitors or attempts to infiltrate political groups.  Freedom
of the press can be compromised when the government subpoenas
journalists to provide the identities of confidential sources, or when
the police search the offices or computers of media entities.  And with
blogs supplementing the traditional media, searches of individual
homes and computers might also implicate journalistic activities.9
Today, in an effort to fight the war on terrorism and protect
national security, the government gathers extensive information about
people’s associational ties and their communicative activity.  Section
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act permits the FBI to “make an applica-
tion for an order requiring the production of any tangible things
(including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an
5 Saul Hansell, Online Trail Can Lead to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2006, at C1.
6 Bob Tedeschi, Patriot Act Has Led Online Buyers and Sellers to Watch What They
Do.  Could It Threaten Internet Business?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2003, at C6.
7 Felicity Barringer, Using Books as Evidence Against Their Readers, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2001, at 4.3.
8 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE 31–33 (2000).
9 See David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 434–35 (2002)
(noting that what constitutes “the press” for constitutional purposes is called into question
by blogging).
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investigation . . . to protect against international terrorism or clandes-
tine intelligence activities.”10  Shortly after September 11th, the Bush
Administration authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to
engage in warrantless wiretapping of international phone calls and the
gathering of phone records en masse.11  The FBI began canvassing for
information about worshippers at several mosques.12  Furthermore,
the government has been engaging in “data mining”—examining data
for various links between people or for certain patterns of behavior.13
Although First Amendment activities are frequently involved in
government investigations, the First Amendment is rarely invoked
when courts apply the constitutional procedural safeguards that
govern such investigations.14  This Article endeavors to establish a
foundation for the development of First Amendment criminal proce-
dure.  I contend that there are doctrinal, historical, and normative
foundations for the First Amendment to play a significant role in reg-
ulating government information gathering.  I explore when govern-
ment investigations should trigger First Amendment protection and
what kinds of safeguards the First Amendment should require.
Part I discusses the current landscape of criminal procedure pro-
tections for First Amendment activity and argues that current rules
leave many activities that are central to First Amendment values
unprotected.  Government information gathering frequently impli-
cates First Amendment values, but courts and commentators ana-
lyzing the constitutionality of government searches have traditionally
focused only on the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  Under current
law, however, much government information gathering affecting First
10 USA PATRIOT Act § 215, 115 Stat. 287 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1861 (Supp. III 2005)).
11 See Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA
TODAY, May 11, 2006, at A1 (reporting on NSA program to collect millions of call records
from telephone companies and noting that while NSA wiretapping authority is limited to
international calls, acquisition of phone records may facilitate broad access to personal
information about domestic callers).  While the details of the NSA surveillance and infor-
mation gathering programs are still shrouded in secrecy, it seems clear that the information
gathered by the NSA relates to communication and association. See Seymour M. Hersh,
Listening In, NEW YORKER, May 2006, at 25 (describing, in conjunction with NSA surveil-
lance and information gathering programs, NSA’s “chaining” process that begins with sus-
pect phone number and then expands outward through several “levels of separation” to
observe calling patterns of persons associated with suspect number).
12 Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association:  Political Profiling, Surveillance and
the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 625–26 (2004).
13 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DATA MINING:  FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE
RANGE OF USES 1–3 (2004) (discussing various government data mining endeavors);
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY
LAW 604–17 (2d ed. 2006) (describing government data mining programs).
14 See infra Part I.
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Amendment activity falls outside the scope of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment regulation.
Part II sets forth the positive case for First Amendment criminal
procedure.  I contend that First Amendment protection against gov-
ernment information gathering is justified by the historical connec-
tions between the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, the history of
government investigations into First Amendment activity, and several
lines of First Amendment doctrine.
Part III explores the contours and consequences of developing
First Amendment criminal procedure.  The First Amendment could
conceivably be applied so broadly that it would swallow up the field of
criminal procedure.  I discuss where the boundaries of First Amend-
ment protection should extend and the kind of protection the First
Amendment should require.  I then apply my theory of First Amend-
ment criminal procedure to various examples of government informa-
tion gathering.
I
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND FIRST
AMENDMENT ACTIVITIES
Although government information gathering can implicate cen-
tral First Amendment values, it has typically been regulated by crim-
inal procedure rules established under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.  I argue that current criminal procedure rules under-
protect First Amendment activities, leaving them exposed to intrusive
government information gathering.  While courts have acknowledged
that searches for certain materials may implicate First Amendment
values, the Supreme Court has not resolved the question of how to
protect First Amendment activities when they fall outside the scope of
the Fourth Amendment.  I argue that the First Amendment itself must
be understood as an independent source of criminal procedure rules.
A. Two Separate Worlds of Constitutional Law
Constitutional criminal procedure and the First Amendment cur-
rently occupy two worlds that rarely intermingle.  In law schools, the
First Amendment is taught separately from the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.  First Amendment scholars rarely delve into constitu-
tional criminal procedure, and criminal procedure scholars rarely con-
sider the First Amendment implications of government searches.  This
is not surprising, given that the criminal procedure amendments and
the First Amendment operate to protect constitutional rights in very
different ways.  The Fourth and Fifth Amendments establish proce-
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dures for government information gathering—thresholds to justify
searches, requirements for judicial oversight, rules to minimize the
scope of searches, and limits on interrogation.  The First Amendment,
in contrast, works primarily by striking down the application of partic-
ular laws, regulations, or executive activities.
In examining a challenge to a government activity under the
Fourth Amendment,15 a court must first determine whether the gov-
ernment action falls within the scope of the Amendment’s protection,
and only then ask whether appropriate procedures were followed.  To
determine whether a particular information gathering practice falls
within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, courts apply the “reason-
able expectation of privacy” test set forth in Justice Harlan’s concur-
rence in Katz v. United States.16  The test examines whether a person
exhibits an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and whether
“the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”17
If the Fourth Amendment applies, it requires that a search or
seizure be “reasonable.”  In most cases, a search will be reasonable if
government officials have obtained a search warrant, which requires
establishing “probable cause” before a neutral judge or magistrate.18
Probable cause requires “reasonably trustworthy information . . . suf-
ficient . . . to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an
offense has been or is being committed” or that evidence will be
found in the place to be searched.19  When the Fourth Amendment is
violated, the typical remedy is the “exclusionary rule”—the evidence
obtained through the violation is suppressed at trial.20
The Fifth Amendment regulates government interrogations
meant to glean incriminating information.  The Fifth Amendment’s
privilege against self-incrimination provides:  “No person shall . . . be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”21  As
interpreted by the Supreme Court, the privilege bars compelled testi-
15 The Fourth Amendment provides that people shall “be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” and that “no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
16 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
18 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (noting general rule that when probable
cause is present “a search is generally ‘reasonable’” for purposes of Fourth Amendment).
19 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
20 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\82-1\NYU103.txt unknown Seq: 8 13-MAR-07 13:34
April 2007] FIRST AMENDMENT AS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 119
monial self-incrimination.22  If a defendant’s statement is obtained in
violation of the Fifth Amendment, it cannot be used at trial.23
In contrast, a court hearing a First Amendment challenge to a law
generally examines the law’s substantive validity.  The First Amend-
ment restricts laws “respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”24  Most restric-
tions on freedom of speech or association are analyzed under either
strict or intermediate scrutiny, depending on the nature of the restric-
tion.  Under strict scrutiny, a law must be the “least restrictive means”
to achieve a “compelling” government interest,25 while intermediate
scrutiny requires a law to be “narrowly tailored” to a “significant gov-
ernment interest” and “leave open ample alternative channels of com-
munication.”26  Laws and actions that do not survive the appropriate
level of scrutiny are invalid.
Thus, under current doctrine, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
mandate procedures for investigating violations of law, while the First
Amendment is largely about the validity of substantive laws.  First
Amendment doctrine tells us a lot about what conduct can or cannot
be criminalized, but it tells us little about what process the govern-
ment must follow to conduct investigations.  As a result, when govern-
ment information gathering implicates First Amendment activities, it
is regulated, if at all, only by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  But
as I demonstrate below, Fourth and Fifth Amendment doctrine is
inadequate to safeguard central First Amendment values that are
implicated by government information gathering.
B. First Amendment Values and Government
Information Gathering
Today in the United States, few question the importance of the
First Amendment.  Perhaps more than any other constitutional
amendment, the First Amendment has iconic status and wields tre-
22 The information must be compelled; it must involve testimony (not documents and
things); and it must be incriminating. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761
& n.5 (1966) (upholding use of compulsory blood test because Fifth Amendment “protects
an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the
State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature”).
23 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978); Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266
U.S. 1, 14 (1924).
24 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25 Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
26 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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mendous power.27  It covers a broad constellation of fundamental
freedoms, encompassing speech, association, the consumption of
ideas, the press, and religion.  As John Milton eloquently argued in
1644, “the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to
conscience [is] above all liberties.”28  First Amendment freedoms pro-
mote individual autonomy29 and are essential for democracy.30  As
Justice Brandeis argued, “freedom to think as you will and to speak as
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth,” and “without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile.”31  The Supreme Court once observed that the First
Amendment is “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly
every other form of freedom.”32
Understood broadly, the First Amendment aims to ensure
freedom of thought and belief.  The Court clearly articulated this
value in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette33 when it invali-
dated a compulsory flag salute because it invaded “the [individual’s]
sphere of intellect and spirit.”34  Vincent Blasi and Seana Shiffrin have
noted that “what underpins Barnette is the First Amendment interest
in the speaker’s freedom of thought and freedom of conscience.”35
Further, they observe:  “The speaker, as well as the community of
which she is a part, has an interest in her thinking and reasoning about
27 See Robert L. Tsai, Speech and Strife, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 86 (2004)
(“The right to free speech remains the most cherished and recognizable right . . . .”).
28 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), reprinted in AREOPAGITICA AND OTHER
PROSE WRITINGS 58 (William Haller, ed., MacMillan 1927).
29 See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982)
(“[F]ree speech ultimately serves only one true value, which I have labeled ‘individual self-
realization.’”); David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law:  Toward a Moral
Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1975) (“The value of free
expression . . . rests on its deep relation to self-respect arising from autonomous self-deter-
mination . . . .”); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 334, 353–60 (1991) (presenting autonomy as justification for principle that
speech cannot be restricted solely on grounds of its persuasiveness).
30 See OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3 (1996) (“Speech is valued so
importantly in the Constitution . . . not because it is a form of self-expression or self-
actualization but rather because it is essential for collective self-determination.”);
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26 (1960) (contending that First Amend-
ment exists to protect political deliberation); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 255, 301 (1992) (“[T]he First Amendment is principally about political
deliberation.”).
31 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
32 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
33 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
34 Id. at 642.
35 Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette:  The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW STORIES 433, 457 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
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subjects sincerely and authentically.”36  Democracy depends upon citi-
zens who are free to formulate their own beliefs.37  Government infor-
mation gathering can threaten the ability to express oneself,
communicate with others, explore new ideas, and join political groups.
Government probing can lessen the effectiveness of democratic
participation by depriving speakers of anonymity, which can be essen-
tial for forthright expression.  The Supreme Court has held that pro-
tecting anonymity is necessary to foster speech about unpopular
views:  “Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout
history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either
anonymously or not at all.”38  According to the Court, “identification
and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of
public matters of importance.”39  Sociologist Robert Putnam points
out that “[a]nonymity and the absence of social cues inhibit social con-
trol—that is, after all, why we have the secret ballot.”40  Investigative
inquiries into the identities of speakers can thus deter them from
uttering their views or dilute the vitality of their speech.
Government information gathering can also discourage or subdue
conversations.  Traditionally, the First Amendment was understood as
protecting the speaker at the street corner or the political group
staging a public demonstration.  Alexander Meiklejohn’s vision of free
speech exemplifies this view; he uses the analogy of the town meeting
as the epitome of what the First Amendment protects.41  But political
discourse does not just occur on soapboxes before large crowds; it also
thrives in private enclaves between small groups of people.  Freedom
of speech should and does protect the ability of individuals to commu-
nicate with each other, regardless of whether the exchange of ideas
occurs between two people or among a million.  In other words, the
First Amendment safeguards not just speeches and rallies but conver-
sations.  People formulate their political opinions and debate politics
mostly off-stage, between friends, family, and acquaintances, among
36 Id. at 461.
37 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1609, 1653 (1999) (“The health of a democratic society depends both on the group-oriented
process of democratic deliberation and the functioning of each person’s capacity for self-
governance.”).
38 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
39 Id. at 65.
40 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE:  THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMER-
ICAN COMMUNITY 173 (2000); see also C. Keith Boone, Privacy and Community, 9 SOC.
THEORY & PRAC. 1, 8 (1983) (“Privacy seems vital to a democratic society [because] . . . it
underwrites the freedom to vote, to hold political discussions, and to associate freely away
from the glare of the public eye and without fear of reprisal.”).
41 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 30, at 24 (describing “the traditional American town
meeting” as “a model by which free political procedures may be measured”).
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fellow religious worshippers, and within groups with shared values
and commitments.  Such conversations depend upon privacy.  Without
protection against government probing, countless conversations might
never occur or might be carried on in more muted and cautious tones.
In addition to protecting expression, the First Amendment safe-
guards the receipt of ideas.42  Reading, listening, and engaging in
intellectual inquiry facilitate the formulation of the thoughts and
beliefs from which speech germinates.43  Even when not leading to
speech, the right to receive ideas is still valuable, for as Marc Blitz
contends, it promotes “vigorous self-examination and free intellectual
exploration.”44  “[W]hen individuals encounter dissenting or obscure
views merely by receiving or exploring information,” Blitz argues,
“they exercise their First Amendment freedom without saying a word
about what they believe.”45  The receipt of ideas is essential for fur-
thering not just individual autonomy, but also democratic participa-
tion.  Exposure to ideas shapes people’s political beliefs even if they
are never publicly expressed.  People might vote differently, for
example, after encountering new ideas.  Government information
gathering of the consumption of ideas can make people reticent to
read controversial books or probe unpopular viewpoints.  People
might be fearful of being linked to ideas they merely want to investi-
gate rather than adopt or endorse.
As with the communication and receipt of ideas, freedom of asso-
ciation can be quelled by governmental invasions of privacy.  Free
association is fundamental to democratic participation; in the words of
Alexis de Tocqueville, it is one of the “foundations of society.”46
People may be reluctant to join certain groups if the government is
recording membership information.  As the Supreme Court once
declared:  “Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of associa-
tion, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”47
42 See infra Part II.B.3.
43 Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously:  A Closer Look at “Copyright Man-
agement” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1006 (1996) (“Thoughts and opinions,
which are the predicates to speech, cannot arise in a vacuum.  Whatever their content, they
are responses formed to things heard or read.”).
44 Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in Living:
Libraries, the Right to Read, and a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied Right
to Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REV. 799, 803 (2006).
45 Id. at 802–03.
46 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 196 (Vintage Books 1990)
(1835).
47 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
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Therefore, uninhibited conversations, association, and exchange
of ideas can be stifled by the searching light of government inquest
and observation.  Surveillance can make people reluctant to engage in
robust and candid discourse.48  It can inhibit deliberative democracy
and individual self-determination.49  Government information gath-
ering can thus strike at the heart of First Amendment values.
C. Criminal Procedure and First Amendment Values
Although government information gathering often implicates
First Amendment values, courts and commentators have generally
analyzed information gathering under the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments, leaving First Amendment activities with little protection.  In
many cases, Fourth and Fifth Amendment protection has receded in
precisely those areas most important to First Amendment values.
The ability to keep personal papers and records of associational
ties private is a central First Amendment value.  But despite their First
Amendment importance, the broad subpoena power and the Fourth
Amendment’s third-party doctrine leave these documents unpro-
tected from government scrutiny.  If the government wants to search a
person’s home for documents, the Fourth Amendment will usually
require a search warrant supported by probable cause.50  However, if
the government uses a subpoena, the level of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment protection is different.  Under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a “subpoena may order the witness to produce
any books, papers, documents, data, or other objects the subpoena
designates.”51  Subpoenas do not require probable cause or even judi-
cial supervision.52  Although subpoenas may be challenged in court,
48 See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1260 (1998) (“Simply put, surveillance leads to self-censorship.”); see also Julie E.
Cohen, Examined Lives:  Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1373, 1426 (2000) (arguing that surveillance results in “a subtle yet fundamental shift
in the content of our character, a blunting and blurring of rough edges and sharp lines”);
Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy:  Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right
to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 242–47 (2002) (arguing that exposure to surveillance
alters people’s behavior, causing them to become more cautious in their actions).
49 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 37, at 1648–59 (arguing that lack of adequate privacy
protection on Internet undermines its potential as forum for deliberative democracy, which
depends on capacity for individual self-determination online).
50 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“With few exceptions, the ques-
tion whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be
answered no.”).
51 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(1).
52 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a) (“The clerk must issue a blank subpoena—signed and
sealed—to the party requesting it, and that party must fill in the blanks before the sub-
poena is served.”); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d 341, 347–48 (4th Cir. 2000)
(“While the Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable searches and
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they usually are quashed only if they severely overreach.53  As
William Stuntz notes, Kenneth Starr in his investigation of President
Clinton used subpoenas much more than search warrants:
This use of the grand jury and its power to subpoena, rather than
the police and their power to search, gave Starr’s team the authority
to find out just about anything it might have wanted.  For while
searches typically require probable cause or reasonable suspicion
and sometimes require a warrant, subpoenas require nothing, save
that the subpoena not be unreasonably burdensome to its target.
Few burdens are deemed unreasonable.54
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments provide only minimal limita-
tions on subpoenas.  In United States v. Dionisio,55 the Supreme Court
held that subpoenas generally do not constitute a Fourth Amendment
search.56  The Fifth Amendment will also not generally bar subpoenas
for a person’s documents even when they contain incriminating state-
ments; instead, it will only provide protection when the act of pro-
ducing documents “has communicative aspects of its own, wholly
aside from the contents of the papers produced.”57  As Christopher
Slobogin observes, however, the “lion’s share of subpoenas that seek
personal papers . . . are directed at third parties.”58  The Court con-
cluded in Couch v. United States59 and in Fisher v. United States60 that
seizures, it imposes a probable cause requirement only on the issuance of warrants.  Thus,
unless subpoenas are warrants, they are limited by the general reasonableness standard of
the Fourth Amendment[,] . . . not by the probable cause requirement.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)); Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Pa., 975
F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Specifically, Fed.R.Crim.P. 17 provides in relevant part that
the clerk of the court, without judicial supervision, shall issue a subpoena to a party
requesting it.”).
53 A subpoena will be quashed on relevancy grounds if “there is no reasonable possi-
bility that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce information rele-
vant to the general subject of the grand jury’s investigation.”  United States v. R. Enters.,
Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991).
54 William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 857–58  (2001).
55 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
56 Id. at 8.  The Court was nonetheless not prepared to conclude that subpoenas always
fall outside the Fourth Amendment, stating that “[t]he Fourth Amendment provides pro-
tection against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its terms ‘to be regarded
as reasonable.’” Id. at 11 (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906)).
57 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
58 Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 822 (2005).
59 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973) (subpoena to individual’s accountant for his documents did
not violate Fifth Amendment).
60 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410–11 (1976) (holding that subpoena for documents in posses-
sion of attorney for party being investigated did not violate Fifth Amendment); see also
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 477 (1976) (holding that gathering information
already in existence and voluntarily committed to writing did not violate Fifth
Amendment).
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subpoenas to third parties for a person’s papers do not implicate the
Fifth Amendment.
Likewise, the Fourth Amendment does not provide protection
when the government seeks information about a person from a third
party, whether through a subpoena or through some other means.
Under the third-party doctrine, if a person’s information is maintained
by a third party, then she has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
that information.  In United States v. Miller,61 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in financial
records maintained by one’s bank:  “[T]he Fourth Amendment does
not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by him to Government authorities.”62  The Court held in
Smith v. Maryland63 that people cannot “harbor any general expecta-
tion that the [phone] numbers they dial will remain secret” because
they “know that they must convey numerical information to the
phone company.”64  Thus, the government could access the phone
numbers dialed (via a pen register) without implicating the Fourth
Amendment.65
In several cases, lower courts have also applied the third-party
doctrine to records held by ISPs of a person’s communications via
computer.  In United States v. Hambrick,66 the government obtained a
defendant’s customer records from his ISP, MindSpring.  With these
records, law enforcement officials were able to link his pseudonymous
pen name to his real name.  The court concluded that the defendant
had no Fourth Amendment protection in his records because he
“knowingly revealed his name, address, credit card number, and tele-
phone number to MindSpring and its employees.”67  Likewise, in
United States v. Kennedy,68 the court concluded that a defendant’s ISP
records were not protected by the Fourth Amendment because he
“knowing[ly] revealed [to his ISP] all information connected to [his]
IP address.”69  In Guest v. Leis,70 the Sixth Circuit held that individ-
uals “lack a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in their [Internet ser-
61 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
62 Id. at 443.
63 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
64 Id. at 743.
65 Id. at 745–46.  “A pen register is a device that is typically installed at the telephone
company’s offices that can record the telephone numbers a person dials.”  Daniel J.
Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1083, 1134 n.306 (2002).
66 55 F. Supp. 2d 504 (W.D. Va. 1999).
67 Id. at 508.
68 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Kan. 2000).
69 Id. at 1110.
70 255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001).
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vice] subscriber information because they communicate[ ] it to the
systems operators.”71
Therefore, if one’s papers are confined to one’s home, they are
protected by the general rule that the government needs a warrant to
search one’s home.  But if one’s papers (or the data contained within
them) are in the hands of another, they enjoy little or no Fourth and
Fifth Amendment protection.  As I have discussed extensively else-
where, much of our personal information today is in the hands of third
parties,72 and much of this information concerns activities protected
under the First Amendment.
The third-party doctrine reflects a broader principle about how
the Fourth Amendment operates.  The Fourth Amendment focuses
not on what various records or documents can reveal, but rather upon
where they are located or who possesses them.  For example, bags and
containers are protected from searches under the Fourth Amendment,
but garbage is not.73  As the Court observed in another case, “Once
placed within . . . a container, a diary and a dishpan are equally pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment.”74
Due to changes in technology and the realities of modern life,
much First Amendment activity now leaves digital fingerprints beyond
private zones protected by the Fourth Amendment.  In the past, per-
sonal papers and correspondence were often located in people’s
homes, which have always received strong Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.  People’s conversations would take place in private places or
through sealed letters, often shielding them from government access
without a search warrant.  Today, however, Internet surfing in the
seclusion of one’s own home creates data trails with third parties in
distant locations.  The books a person buys can be tracked by looking
at records maintained by booksellers such as Amazon.com.  Much of
what a person says and does today finds its way into the record sys-
tems of various companies.  In the past, much speaking, association,
and reading occurred in secluded places, walled off from the rest of
the world.  But with modern technology, First Amendment activity
71 Id. at 336.
72 See SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 165–75.
73 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–40 (1988) (holding that individuals lack
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left for collection because it will be conveyed
“to a third party, the trash collector”).
74 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1981).  Not all searches of containers
require a warrant, such as containers in automobiles. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 822–23 (1982) (“As Justice Stewart stated in Robbins, the Fourth Amendment pro-
vides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain view.
But the protection afforded by the Amendment varies in different settings.” (internal cita-
tion omitted)).
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occurs via e-mail, the Internet, and the telephone.  It is no longer con-
fined to private zones such as the home and no longer benefits from
Fourth Amendment protection.
The ability to engage in political activity and discussion in public
is also of central importance to the First Amendment, but falls outside
Fourth Amendment protection.  Merely observing something in “plain
view” is not a search.75  For example, the government may monitor
various political groups or may send officers to record information
about public demonstrations.  The Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to surveillance in public.76
In addition, government officials may use informants or pose as
secret agents to infiltrate a political group.  Under the “assumption of
risk” doctrine in Fourth Amendment law, information is not protected
if a person revealed it to a police informant or undercover officer.77
In Hoffa v. United States,78 for example, the Court concluded that
there was no Fourth Amendment protection when a defendant made
statements to an undercover informant because the informant was
“not a surreptitious eavesdropper.”79  The defendant willingly spoke
with the informant and relied “upon his misplaced confidence that
[the informant] would not reveal his wrongdoing.”80  Informants or
undercover agents can even use concealed electronic surveillance
devices without triggering Fourth Amendment protection.81
Thus through a combination of the Court’s interpretive
maneuverings and technological change, the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments have receded from protecting against many instances of law
enforcement activity that implicate First Amendment values.  When
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments protected these activities, First
Amendment protection may have been redundant and unnecessary.
Although the Fourth and Fifth Amendments have receded from this
75 Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
76 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448–50 (1989) (holding that aerial surveillance of
greenhouse interior with roof panels missing was not covered by Fourth Amendment as
observed activity was visible to public from sky); see also Slobogin, supra note 48, at 233
(“Meaningful legal strictures on government use of public surveillance cameras in Great
Britain, Canada, and the United States are non-existent.”).
77 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210–11, 213 (1966) (holding that
Fourth Amendment did not apply when defendant invited undercover agent into his home
to engage in illegal sale of narcotics).
78 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
79 Id. at 302.
80 Id.
81 See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (holding that Fourth
Amendment does not protect information conveyed to government informant who wears
radio transmitter); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753–54 (1952) (concluding that
Fourth Amendment does not apply when person misplaces trust by talking to bugged gov-
ernment informant).
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area, First Amendment protection should remain.  Since the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments are increasingly not applicable, it is even more
imperative that the First Amendment safeguard activities central to its
values and purpose.
D. An Open Question
Although the First Amendment itself has seldom been applied in
the context of a search, seizure, or other government investigation,82
the Supreme Court has on rare occasion considered how First Amend-
ment values affect traditional Fourth Amendment cases.  In one line
of cases, the Supreme Court recognized the relationship between the
First and Fourth Amendments in searches and seizures of expressive
material.  These cases hold that when First Amendment activities are
implicated by a search or a seizure, Fourth Amendment procedures
must be followed with “scrupulous exactitude.”  But despite the rig-
orous-sounding language, the “scrupulous exactitude” standard
merely requires following the typical protections of the Fourth
Amendment (i.e., warrants supported by probable cause).  More
importantly, the scrupulous exactitude cases tell us nothing about
what procedures should apply when First Amendment activity falls
outside the scope of current Fourth and Fifth Amendment protection.
The scrupulous exactitude cases began in 1961 when the Supreme
Court held in Marcus v. Search Warrant83 that large-scale searches and
seizures of obscene publications provided too much discretion to
police officers to determine which materials to seize.84  The Court
concluded that these searches and seizures were unconstitutional,
noting that “[h]istorically the struggle for freedom of speech and press
in England was bound up with the issue of the scope of the search and
seizure power.”85  A few years later, a plurality of Justices explained
in A Quantity of Books v. Kansas86 that because obscene books
82 Occasionally, in dissents and dicta, Justices have mentioned how government investi-
gations can implicate First Amendment rights. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Court,
407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972) (“Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary
when the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their
political beliefs.”); White, 401 U.S. at 762 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Monitoring, if preva-
lent, certainly kills free discourse and spontaneous utterances.  Free discourse—a First
Amendment value . . . is not free if there is surveillance.”); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427, 470 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that “historically the search and
seizure power was used to suppress freedom of speech and of the press” and that “freedom
of speech is undermined where people fear to speak unconstrainedly in what they suppose
to be the privacy of home and office”).
83 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
84 See id. at 731–32.
85 Id. at 724.
86 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
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enjoyed First Amendment protection, they could not be treated like
any other form of contraband.87
In later cases, the Court went on to find that First Amendment
rights could be sufficiently protected by means of usual Fourth
Amendment procedures. Stanford v. Texas88 concerned an investiga-
tion by Texas authorities into John Stanford’s involvement with the
Communist Party.  Pursuant to a warrant, Texas police searched
Stanford’s home to gather evidence that he had violated a Texas
statute outlawing the Communist Party.89  The police hauled away
fourteen cartons consisting of about two thousand books and papers,
including works by Karl Marx, Jean-Paul Sartre, Fidel Castro, Pope
John XXIII, and, ironically, Justice Hugo Black.  Stanford’s records,
bills, and personal correspondence were also seized.  The Supreme
Court held first that the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment
because it took place pursuant to a “general warrant,” the “kind
which it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to forbid.”90  The
Court then noted that the search also implicated First Amendment
rights, which could be adequately protected only by careful adherence
to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment:
In short . . . the constitutional requirement that warrants must par-
ticularly describe the “things to be seized” is to be accorded the most
scrupulous exactitude when the “things” are books and the basis for
their seizure is the ideas which they contain.  No less a standard
could be faithful to First Amendment freedoms.91
In at least one case, Roaden v. Kentucky,92 the Court suggested
that the First Amendment might expand the scope of the Fourth
Amendment, while not necessarily expanding the type of protections
required. Roaden involved a sheriff who watched a film at a drive-in
theater, concluded it was obscene, arrested the manager, and seized a
copy of the film without a warrant.  The Court found that the seizure
implicated the First Amendment right to free speech, and suggested
that the First Amendment implications provided a basis for Fourth
Amendment protection:  “The setting of the bookstore or the com-
mercial theater, each presumptively under the protection of the First
87 Id. at 211–12.
88 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
89 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6889-3A, § 2 (Vernon 1957) (repealed 1993).
90 Stanford, 379 U.S. at 480.
91 Id. at 485 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).  In Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v.
Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968), the Court appeared to reaffirm the rule of Marcus and
Stanford when it invalidated a warrant to seize obscene films because the evidentiary sup-
port offered for it “fell short of constitutional requirements demanding necessary sensi-
tivity to freedom of expression.” Id. at 637.
92 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\82-1\NYU103.txt unknown Seq: 19 13-MAR-07 13:34
130 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:112
Amendment, invokes such Fourth Amendment warrant requirements
because we examine what is ‘unreasonable’ in the light of the values
of freedom of expression.”93
A 1978 case illustrated that Fourth Amendment “scrupulous
exactitude” protection of First Amendment activity will in most
cases only require a warrant supported by probable cause. Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily involved a police search of a college newspaper’s office
to gather photographs of a demonstration that had turned violent.94
Although the newspaper did not participate in the demonstration and
nobody at the newspaper was suspected of criminal activity, the
Fourth Amendment only required that the police obtain a warrant by
demonstrating probable cause that the search would uncover evidence
of a crime.95  The newspaper argued that search of its offices impli-
cated the First Amendment because it “seriously threaten[ed] the
ability of the press to gather, analyze, and disseminate news.”96
Although the Court recognized that First Amendment activities
were implicated by the search, it concluded that “the prior cases do no
more than insist that the courts apply the warrant requirements with
particular exactitude when First Amendment interests would be
endangered by the search.”97  Accordingly, First Amendment interests
are sufficiently protected by “the preconditions for a warrant.”98  In
later cases, the Court clarified that the First Amendment does not
require a “higher standard” than a warrant supported by probable
cause for seizures of books or films.99  So while the Court has recog-
nized that government information gathering implicates First Amend-
ment rights, it has found that these rights are not deserving of more
criminal procedure protections than other activities.
In these cases, however, the Court left a key question unan-
swered.  In each case where the Court found that First Amendment
93 Id. at 504.
94 436 U.S. 547, 550–51 (1978).
95 Id. at 554.
96 Id. at 563.
97 Id. at 565.
98 Id.  Congress responded to the problem in the Zurcher case with the Privacy Protec-
tion Act, which prevents government officers from collecting documents from “a person
reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book,
broadcast, or other similar form of public communication.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a) (2000).
99 New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 873–74 (1986) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985) (holding that police officer
merely purchasing book does not implicate Fourth or First Amendment). But cf. Fort
Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 63 (1989) (holding that where allegedly obscene
films or books are seized for purposes of destroying them or blocking their distribution, as
opposed to seizing single copy to preserve evidence of criminal undertaking, probable
cause alone is insufficient to justify seizure).
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rights were compromised, the government information gathering fell
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment.  But when the Fourth
Amendment does not apply, there are no procedures to follow with
scrupulous exactitude.  If government information gathering impli-
cates First Amendment activities but the Fourth Amendment does not
apply, what protections should be required?
One approach would be to conclude that the First Amendment is
implicated only when government information gathering falls within
the Fourth Amendment’s scope.  However, although they overlap to
some degree, the First and the Fourth Amendments protect different
things.  The Fourth Amendment is currently understood by the Court
to protect privacy, and the test for determining the scope of the
Fourth Amendment is the existence of a reasonable expectation of
privacy.100  First Amendment activity, in contrast, can be hindered
without a violation of privacy, such as when the government engages
in public surveillance of political activity.  If First Amendment activi-
ties are implicated, it is not clear why protection should depend upon
whether the activities are also encompassed within the scope of the
Fourth Amendment.
Another approach is to conclude that the First Amendment
enlarges the scope of the Fourth Amendment.  The Court could draw
on Roaden v. Kentucky and the scrupulous exactitude cases to con-
clude that the scope of the Fourth Amendment must be determined
not only by reference to the reasonable expectation of privacy test but
also based on the extent to which First Amendment activities are
implicated.  Akhil Amar, for example, has argued that First Amend-
ment activities should be a factor in assessing the reasonableness of a
search.  According to Amar, reasonableness is a way of “integrating
First Amendment concerns explicitly into the Fourth Amendment
analysis,”101 because, as the Court itself has noted, “A seizure reason-
able as to one type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a
different setting or with respect to another kind of material.”102  Inte-
grating First Amendment values into Fourth Amendment analysis cer-
tainly might protect some First Amendment activities involved in
government information gathering.  But the substantive values under-
pinning the First Amendment are more thoroughly developed in First
100 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of
the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted
intrusion by the State.”).
101 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 806
(1994).
102 Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 564 (quoting Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973)).
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Amendment jurisprudence, and it is more appropriate to look to that
jurisprudence for guidance.
In this Article, I argue that the First Amendment should and does
provide an independent basis for protection from intrusive govern-
ment information gathering.  The scrupulous exactitude cases hold
that where both the First and the Fourth Amendment are applicable,
the procedures of the Fourth are sufficient to satisfy the demands of
the First.  But when those Fourth Amendment procedures are unavail-
able because the Court has concluded that the Fourth Amendment
does not cover a particular activity, the scrupulous exactitude cases do
not tell us what to do.  If the government information gathering still
implicates First Amendment rights, the First Amendment should
require its own procedural safeguards.  Under this approach, the First
Amendment serves as an independent source of criminal procedure.
II
FIRST AMENDMENT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In this Part, I set forth the historical and doctrinal basis for devel-
oping the First Amendment as an independent source of criminal pro-
cedure.  While courts have not traditionally looked to the First
Amendment as an independent source of procedural rules, important
strands of history and doctrine justify First Amendment protections in
the information gathering context.  First, the amendments in the Bill
of Rights need not be compartmentalized to isolated and separate
domains.  The First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments share a common
history.  Among the factors that motivated the adoption of these
amendments were government inquests into speech, religion, belief,
and association.  More recent history also shows that our Founders’
concerns about these inquests are still relevant.  Second, current First
Amendment doctrine on surveillance of political activities, anonymity,
free association, press protection, and subpoenas provides a founda-
tion for the development of First Amendment criminal procedure.
A. Historical Justifications
1. The Origins of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments
An examination of the historical ties between the First, Fourth,
and Fifth Amendments demonstrates the significant extent to which
First Amendment values are implicated in criminal procedure.103
103 The scholars I discuss in this Section have many significant disagreements over the
historical background of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.  Rather than address
these disagreements, I have focused on certain dimensions of the history relevant to this
Article.  For more background on these debates, see Morgan Cloud, Searching Through
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Contemporary constitutional pedagogy has often splintered the Bill of
Rights into separate domains, but as Akhil Amar argues, “our Consti-
tution is a single document . . . not a jumble of disconnected
clauses.”104 “Instead of being studied holistically,” Amar observes,
“the Bill [of Rights] has been chopped up into discrete chunks of text,
with each bit examined in isolation.”105  This is especially true with the
First Amendment and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, which are
often taught separately in different courses.  But while the First,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments are often studied separately, they in
fact emerged to protect related values.
The First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments share a common back-
ground in concerns about seditious libel.106  As William Stuntz
observes:  “Fourth and Fifth Amendment history . . . has more in
common with the First Amendment . . . than with criminal procedure
as we know it today.”107  Prosecutions for seditious libel were fre-
quently used in Britain in the eighteenth century as a device to sup-
press criticism of the government, and there were well over a
thousand seditious speech prosecutions in the colonies.108
The Framers were influenced by a series of high-profile seditious
libel cases that took place both in the colonies and in England.109  In
particular, John Peter Zenger was tried for seditious libel in 1735 in
colonial New York, and a jury nullified the law to acquit him.110  The
History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707 (1996) (reviewing William J.
Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment:  Origins and Original Meaning, 602–1791 (1990)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with the New York
University Law Review)).
104 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1201
(1991).
105 Id. at 1131.
106 See, e.g., Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961) (“The Bill of Rights was
fashioned against the background of knowledge that unrestricted power of search and
seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression.”).
107 William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393,
395 (1995).
108 Larry D. Eldridge, Before Zenger:  Truth and Seditious Speech in Colonial America,
1607–1700, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 337, 337 (1995).
109 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004
UTAH L. REV. 977, 1035 & n.364 (“[T]here is strong historical support for the protection of
‘papers,’ that is, materials related to free speech.”); Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and
Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1499–1500 (1996)
(arguing that First and Fourth Amendments were infused by same “spirit” of protecting
dissent); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance:  Accurately Setting the
Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1241
(1988) (“Since colonial days, governmental search and seizure powers have been used to
curb freedom of speech.”).
110 For a description of the Zenger trial, see 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMA-
TION § 1:28, at 1-24.1 to 1-26 (2d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2005).
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Zenger case, in the words of one commentator, served “as a crucible
for the flames of liberty and freedom of the press that were stirring in
the Colonies.”111
An English case, Wilkes v. Wood,112 also generated an enormous
buzz in the colonies.  In 1763 in England, John Wilkes, a prominent
member of Parliament, published a series of anonymous pamphlets
titled The North Briton, including an issue Number 45 that sharply
criticized the King.113  Pursuant to a general warrant authorizing a
search for anything connected to The North Briton Number 45, gov-
ernment officials searched Wilkes’s home, seized his papers, and
arrested him.114  The warrant did not mention Wilkes by name.  Such
general warrants were common at the time and were used to muzzle
the press and squelch political dissent.115
Wilkes and others initiated a civil trespass lawsuit challenging the
general warrant.  At trial, Chief Justice Pratt instructed the jury that if
the government had the power to use general warrants, “it certainly
may affect the person and property of every man in this kingdom, and
is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.”116  The jury found
for Wilkes and the case became the stuff of legend.  It was seen as an
enormous victory for freedom of the press, and the British press
ensured that news about the case was spread far and wide.117  The
number “45” was etched in chalk throughout London, and Benjamin
Franklin noted after a visit that he observed a fifteen-mile stretch
where “45” was marked on practically every door.118  Hailed as a hero
in Britain, Wilkes became a champion in the American colonies as
well.119  As Cuddihy observes:  “Because American newspapers
repeated whatever the British press reported on Wilkes and general
111 William R. Glendon, The Trial of John Peter Zenger, N.Y. ST. B.J., Dec. 1996, at 48,
52.
112 19 Howell’s State Trials 1153 (C.P. 1763), 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.).
113 Stuntz, supra note 107, at 398.  For more information on this case, see TELFORD
TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 29–35 (1969).
114 Stuntz, supra note 107, at 398–99.
115 See Cuddihy, supra note 103, at 651–52 (“To control the press and religious as well as
political dissent, the secretaries of state maintained a steady barrage of general warrants
until 1763.”).
116 Wilkes, 19 Howell’s State Trials at 1167, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498.
117 See Cuddihy, supra note 103, at 927–30 (noting that press accounts of Wilkes’s trial
allowed “stirring proclamations against general warrants [to] reach[ ] countless numbers of
the literate”).
118 Id. at 942.
119 See Amar, supra note 104, at 1177 (“John Wilkes, and the author of the opinion,
Lord Chief Justice Pratt (soon to become Lord Camden), were folk heroes in the
colonies.”).
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warrants, those topics received the same saturation coverage in the
colonies as in the mother country.”120
Two years after the Wilkes case, John Entick challenged a general
warrant in a seditious libel investigation.  Like Wilkes, Entick’s home
had been searched and his papers seized.  In Entick v. Carrington,121
Lord Camden, who was formerly Chief Justice Pratt and the author of
the Wilkes opinion, issued a blistering critique of general warrants.
Camden declared that with a general warrant, a person’s “house is
rifled; his most valuable secrets are taken out of his possession, before
the paper for which he is charged is found to be criminal by any com-
petent jurisdiction, and before he is convicted either of writing, pub-
lishing, or being concerned in the paper.”122  Word of the Entick case
was also greeted with cheer in America, and Wilkes and Lord Camden
were so venerated that towns were named in their honor.123
William Stuntz suggests that Wilkes and Entick were so eminent
because of their protection of First Amendment activities.  Stuntz
notes that restrictions on searches and seizures made it “harder to
prosecute” political crimes such as seditious libel.124  As Stuntz goes
on to argue:
Entick and Wilkes are classic First Amendment cases in a system
with no First Amendment, no vehicle for direct substantive judicial
review.  Restricting paper searches had the effect of limiting govern-
ment power in a class of cases that were, even at the time, deemed
seriously troubling in substantive terms, as shown not only by
Camden’s remarks in Entick but also by the public’s embrace of the
two decisions.125
Stuntz contends that the law of search and seizure is the “consequence
of the strong tradition of using Fourth and Fifth Amendment law as a
shield against government information gathering—a tradition that has
120 Cuddihy, supra note 103, at 1106.  In the year following the Wilkes case, the Boston
Gazette and the Country Journal discussed the case in thirty-six different stories.  Eric
Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869, 876 n.38
(1985).  “Reprints of Wilkes’ Authentic Account of his arrest appeared at Boston, New
York, and Philadelphia before 1763 was finished.  In 1767, at least ten newspapers from
Rhode island [sic] to South Carolina carried either Wilkes’ recollections of The North
Briton searches or comments on those recollections.”  Cuddihy, supra note 103, at 1105–06
(internal citations omitted).
121 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765), 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.).
122 Entick, 19 Howell’s State Trials at 1064.
123 See Amar, supra note 104, at 1177 (“Pennsylvania residents named the town of
Wilkes-Barre after the plaintiff; New Jersey and South Carolina each dedicated a city in
Camden’s honor.”).
124 Stuntz, supra note 107, at 402–03.
125 Id. at 403.
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more to do with protecting free speech than with regulating the
police.”126
The origins of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation are in considerable dispute.  The Fifth Amendment privilege is
based upon a privilege that arose at common law,127 but there is sig-
nificant disagreement as to when and why it emerged.  Leonard Levy
traces the origins of the privilege to resistance to the practice of ex
officio oaths in England in the Middle Ages.128  Puritans and others
who did not conform to the Church were forced to “answer upon their
oath in causes against themselves—and also to answer interrogations
touching their own contempts and crimes objected against them.”129
In mid-seventeenth-century England, John Lilburne’s famous refusal
to submit to the oath when accused of seditious libel led to an intense
public distaste for the ex officio oath and its ultimate abolition in
1641.130
Recent scholarship, however, has proposed an alternative theory
of the creation of the privilege.  John Langbein contends:
[T]he true origins of the common law privilege are to be found not
in the high politics of the English revolutions, but in the rise of
adversary criminal procedure at the end of the eighteenth century.
The privilege against self-incrimination at common law was the
work of defense counsel.131
For a long time after their ratification, the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments lay dormant, unexplored by the Supreme Court.  But in
126 Id. at 395; see also ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT:  A HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789–1868, at 18 (2006) (“The abusive
searches and seizures that captured colonial Americans’ attention frequently involved state
efforts to suppress dissent.”).  A desire to protect expressive activity from government
intrusion was only one of the many influences on the Fourth Amendment. See David E.
Steinberg, An Original Misunderstanding:  Akhil Amar and Fourth Amendment History, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 227, 255 (2005) (“The Fourth Amendment proscription against unrea-
sonable searches originated with English laws that protected homes against breaking and
entering by private citizens.”).
127 Katharine B. Hazlett, The Nineteenth Century Origins of the Fifth Amendment Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 235, 237 (1998).
128 See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 43–82 (2d ed.
1986) (describing history of ex officio oaths).
129 Letter from Charles I to the High Commission (Feb. 4, 1637), in HISTORICAL COL-
LECTIONS; CONSISTING OF STATE PAPERS, AND OTHER AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS;
INTENDED AS MATERIALS FOR AN HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 428
(Ebenezer Hazard ed., Books for Libraries Press 1969) (1792–94).
130 LEVY, supra note 128, at 273–82.
131 John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1994); see also Eben Moglen, Taking the
Fifth:  Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1118 (1994).
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\82-1\NYU103.txt unknown Seq: 26 13-MAR-07 13:34
April 2007] FIRST AMENDMENT AS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 137
the late nineteenth century, when the Supreme Court first interpreted
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, it turned to Wilkes and Entick.
Early Fourth and Fifth Amendment cases involved people’s cor-
respondence and papers.  In 1878, in Ex Parte Jackson,132 the Court
held that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the government from
opening mail:  “The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people
to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and
seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wher-
ever they may be.”133 Ex Parte Jackson provided crucial protection
for First Amendment activities, as the mail was an essential medium
of communication at the time.
Ex Parte Jackson was a prelude to the 1886 case Boyd v. United
States,134  the most important Fourth and Fifth Amendment decision
of the nineteenth century.  In Boyd, law enforcement officials issued a
subpoena in a civil forfeiture proceeding to compel Edward A. Boyd,
a merchant, to produce invoices on cases of imported glass.  As Stuntz
notes, the Court viewed the subpoena as “the functional equivalent of
a search or seizure” because it was “compelled rather than
voluntary.”135
In its interpretation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Boyd
placed Wilkes and Entick at the center of constitutional criminal pro-
cedure.  The Court noted that Entick was one of the “landmarks of
English liberty” and “was welcomed and applauded by the lovers of
liberty in the colonies as well as in the mother country.”136  Further-
more, the Court stated that Entick’s “propositions were in the minds
of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and
were considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by
unreasonable searches and seizures.”137  The Court then held that the
subpoena violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments:
Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circum-
stances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of
a man’s own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evi-
dence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the
condemnation of [Lord Camden’s] judgment.  In this regard the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.138
132 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
133 Id. at 733.
134 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
135 Stuntz, supra note 107, at 423.
136 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626.
137 Id. at 626–27.
138 Id. at 630.
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The Court declared that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments “throw
great light on each other” and that “we have been unable to perceive
that the seizure of a man’s private books and papers to be used in
evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to
be a witness against himself.”139  Although Boyd did not mention the
First Amendment, it functioned to protect a significant amount of
First Amendment activity by guarding personal papers.140
The days of Boyd have long come to an end.  In 1967, with its
decision in Warden v. Hayden, the Supreme Court began an assault on
Boyd.141  In several cases in the 1970s, the Court held that subpoenas
to third parties for a person’s papers do not implicate the Fifth
Amendment.142  Moreover, the Court concluded, subpoenas do not
constitute a Fourth Amendment search.143  The third-party doctrine
and doctrine on public surveillance have also severely curtailed the
Fourth Amendment’s protection of personal writings, reading habits,
associations, and other First Amendment activities.144
2. Government Information Gathering from the Twentieth Century
to the Present
Some might argue that the history of the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments is no longer relevant since seditious libel prosecutions
no longer lurk as a major threat.  But experiences in the twentieth
century through the present demonstrate that government investiga-
tions continue to pose a substantial threat to First Amendment
activity.  Throughout the past century, the government has gathered
information about activities protected by the First Amendment in
troubling ways.145  Between 1940 and 1973, the FBI and CIA secretly
139 Id. at 633.
140 See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era:  Privacy, Prop-
erty, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 592–93 (1996) (“Boyd’s
interpretive linkage of the Fourth Amendment with the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination suggested that papers could be treated differently from other tangible
personal property.”).
141 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301–10 (1967) (rejecting “mere evidence” rule
of Boyd, which had held that under Fourth Amendment police could only seize instrumen-
talities or fruits of crime, but could not seize items, like papers at issue in Boyd, that had
only evidentiary value).  For further discussion of Warden and its limitation of Boyd, see
Morgan Cloud, A Liberal House Divided:  How the Warren Court Dismantled the Fourth
Amendment, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 33, 55–58 (2005).
142 See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409–11 (1976); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973).
143 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 10 (1973).
144 See supra Part I.C.
145 See Fisher, supra note 12, at 623 (finding that from its founding until at least 1970s,
“the FBI regularly conducted politically motivated surveillance, choosing targets based on
their political or religious beliefs”).
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read the mail of thousands of people.146  The FBI has engaged in
extensive surveillance of student political and speech activities on col-
lege campuses.147  During the 1980s, through the “Library Awareness
Program,” the FBI gathered information from people’s library
records.148
During the McCarthy era, from 1946–1956, the FBI gathered
extensive information about Communist Party members for use in
Congress’s inquest into the Party.149  As Ellen Schrecker has
observed, “the FBI was the bureaucratic heart of the McCarthy era.
It designed and ran much of the machinery of political repression,
shaping the loyalty programs, criminal prosecutions, and undercover
operations that pushed the communist issue to the center of American
politics during the early years of the Cold War.”150  In the 1950s, the
FBI maintained a “Security Index” of about 26,000 individuals to
round up in case of a national security emergency.151  The FBI also
used a network of informers to infiltrate the Communist Party.152
From 1956 to 1971, the FBI engaged in a massive attempt to
gather information about scores of political groups as part of its
Counterintelligence Program known as COINTELPRO.153  Among
the targets were the Communist Party, the Ku Klux Klan, antiwar
groups, civil rights groups, women’s rights groups, and gay rights
groups.154  The FBI used the data it collected to hinder the activities
146 WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE:  THE POLITICS OF
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 138 (1998).
147 See HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, SURVEILLANCE IN THE STACKS:  THE FBI’S LIBRARY
AWARENESS PROGRAM 4 (1991).
148 Id. at 2–4; Ulrika Ekman Ault, Note, The FBI’s Library Awareness Program:  Is Big
Brother Reading over Your Shoulder?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532, 1533–39 (1990).
149 See RICHARD GID POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER:  THE LIFE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER
321 (1987).
150 ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES:  MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA 203
(1998).
151 See id. at 207–08.
152 See id. at 228.
153 See SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLI-
GENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 10–12 (1976)
[hereinafter Church Committee Report] (describing COINTELPRO counterintelligence
tactics in detail and characterizing them as “indisputably degrading to a free society”);
DAVID CUNNINGHAM, THERE’S SOMETHING HAPPENING HERE:  THE NEW LEFT, THE
KLAN, AND FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 6–9 (2004) (describing COINTELPRO program
and noting that it led to “thousands of actions” against suspected Communist Party mem-
bers, as well as actions against many other civil rights organizations); POWERS, supra note
149, at 338–39 (discussing origins of COINTELPRO and fact that it applied “wartime
counterintelligence methods to domestic groups”).
154 David Cunningham provides a list of scores of targeted groups. CUNNINGHAM, supra
note 153, at 273–84; see also DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE
CONSTITUTION:  SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 6–7
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of these groups.155  It engaged in zealous surveillance of the civil rights
movement, especially focusing on Martin Luther King, Jr.156  Over a
span of many years, the FBI wiretapped King extensively and
attempted to use the recordings to threaten and intimidate him.157
In 1975, a congressional committee led by Senator Frank Church
(and thus known as the Church Committee) began a sweeping inquiry
into intelligence abuses.  In its 1976 report (the Church Committee
Report), the Church Committee stated:
The Government, operating primarily through secret informants,
but also using other intrusive techniques such as wiretaps,
microphone “bugs,” surreptitious mail opening, and break-ins, has
swept in vast amounts of information about the personal lives,
views, and associations of American citizens. . . . Groups and indi-
viduals have been harassed and disrupted because of their political
views and their lifestyles.  Investigations have been based upon
vague standards whose breadth made excessive collection
inevitable.158
In response to the Church Committee Report, Attorney General
Edward Levi established a set of guidelines for FBI investigations in
1976.159  The guidelines specifically addressed First Amendment activ-
ities:  “First, investigations based solely on unpopular speech, where
there is no threat of violence, were prohibited.  Second, techniques
designed to disrupt organizations engaged in protected First Amend-
ment activity, or to discredit individuals would not be used in any
circumstance.”160
However, under the pressure of a new wave of concerns about
national security, the protections of the guidelines have been slowly
dismantled.  In 1983, Attorney General William French Smith revised
the guidelines to create a lower threshold to open an investigation.161
After the September 11th attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft
made numerous changes to the guidelines.  Among other things, the
new guidelines allow the FBI to gather “publicly available informa-
(2002) (“At the peak of its efforts, the FBI was investigating all major protest movements,
from civil rights activists to Vietnam war protestors to women’s liberation advocates.”).
155 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 153, at 8–9.
156 For more on the FBI’s surveillance of Martin Luther King, Jr., see generally DAVID
J. GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1981).
157 See GARROW, supra note 156, at 101–50.
158 Church Committee Report, supra note 153, at 5.
159 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC SECURITY
INVESTIGATION GUIDELINES (1976).
160 William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Sur-
veillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 69 (2000).
161 See id. at 69–70 (stating that where old guidelines required “specific and articulable
facts” before opening investigation, new guidelines required only “reasonable indication”).
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tion, whether obtained directly or through services or resources
(whether nonprofit or commercial) that compile or analyze such infor-
mation; and information voluntarily provided by private entities.”162
The FBI can also “carry out general topical research, including con-
ducting online searches and accessing online sites and forums.”163
Today, government information gathering—especially in the
name of national security—remains a significant threat to First
Amendment activities.  In response to the threat of terrorism, the
NSA has engaged in warrantless wiretapping of telephone calls; gov-
ernment agencies have increased their demands for personal informa-
tion maintained in business records; the government has gathered
extensive information about financial transactions; and numerous data
mining programs have involved the collection of massive amounts of
personal information.164  These data gathering programs have
occurred under a veil of secrecy, but it is nonetheless clear that moni-
toring telephone calls, analyzing financial transactions, and mining
other personal data likely will yield information relating to conversa-
tions, religious and political activity, and group associations.
While legitimate investigation of terrorist plots may require col-
lecting and examining data about communication and association, the
implications for First Amendment activities advise caution.  In the
famous Keith case,165 Justice Powell wrote that “[n]ational security
cases . . . often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment
values not present in cases of ‘ordinary’ crime.  Though the investiga-
tive duty of the executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is
there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech.”166  With
the lack of transparency surrounding information gathering in the
name of national security, it is difficult to find out precisely what
makes a particular person suspicious and how people’s First Amend-
162 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM
ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS 21–22 (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/general
crimes2.pdf.
163 Id. at 22.  For more background about the guidelines, see generally Daniel J. Solove,
Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1296–98 (2004).
164 See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 3, at 168–75 (describing data mining and government
requests for personal data from businesses); Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy
and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1144–52 (2006) (discussing govern-
ment data mining programs); Cauley, supra note 11 (discussing NSA program to collect
phone call records of millions of Americans without authorization under Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act); Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S.
to Block Terror, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A1 (describing CIA program examining
financial transactions).
165 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).  This case has come to be
known as Keith based on the name of the District Court Judge, Damon Keith.
166 Id. at 313.
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ment activities might turn them into targets of investigation.  People
might be targeted on the basis of their political views, religious beliefs,
and associations.  Even if First Amendment activities play no role in
these determinations, people may nonetheless be reticent to say cer-
tain things, worship in certain places, associate with certain groups, or
even read certain materials out of fear that they might end up on a list
of suspicious persons.167  As David Cole observes, during the
McCarthy era, “most ‘radicals’ were punished not for their speech but
for their membership, affiliation, or sympathetic association with the
Communist Party.”168
The history of government information gathering in the twentieth
century thus suggests that even though concerns raised by seditious
libel may have faded, government investigation practices can still pose
a significant threat to First Amendment activities.  Relying on govern-
ment investigators to police themselves in those areas that are unpro-
tected by current criminal procedure law is highly risky in light of the
historical record.  Developing First Amendment protections against
government information gathering would add a vital and missing
dimension to the current landscape of criminal procedure.
B. Foundations in Doctrine
Several lines of First Amendment cases provide a foundation on
which to develop First Amendment criminal procedure.  The Supreme
Court has noted that “governmental action may be subject to constitu-
tional challenge even though it has only an indirect effect on the exer-
cise of First Amendment rights,”169 and government information
gathering will often indirectly affect the exercise of First Amendment
rights by discouraging expressive and associational activity.  Indirect
effects on First Amendment activities are addressed through the “chil-
ling effect” doctrine.  The chilling effect doctrine recognizes that the
First Amendment can be implicated indirectly and not just through
direct legal prohibitions on speech.170  The key to chilling effect is
deterrence:  “A chilling effect occurs when individuals seeking to
167 See David Cole, The New McCarthyism:  Repeating History in the War on Terrorism,
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2003) [hereinafter Cole, New McCarthyism] (dis-
cussing chilling effect of guilt by association on Communist political activity in McCarthy
era); David Cole, Secrecy, Guilt by Association, and the Terrorist Profile, 15 J.L. &
RELIGION 267, 282–86 (2000–2001) (discussing guilt by association in terrorism-related
cases).
168 Cole, New McCarthyism, supra note 167, at 6.
169 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1972).
170 See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment:  Unraveling the “Chilling
Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 692–93 (1978) (finding chilling effect doctrine independently
significant only for “indirect governmental restriction[s] of protected expression”).
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engage in activity protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment are deterred
from so doing by governmental regulation not specifically directed at
that protected activity.”171
Courts have concluded that government information gathering
indirectly inhibits or “chills” First Amendment liberties in a wide
range of contexts, including surveillance of political activities, identifi-
cation of anonymous speakers, prevention of the anonymous con-
sumption of ideas, discovery of associational ties to political groups,
and enforcement of subpoenas to the press or to third parties for
information about reading habits and speech.  While the cases
addressing these issues are mostly civil, their principles are just as rel-
evant and applicable to criminal cases and to government information
gathering for national security and other purposes.
1. Surveillance of Political Activities
Courts sometimes have found that government surveillance of
political activities can implicate the First Amendment.  The Supreme
Court confronted this issue in a 1972 case, Laird v. Tatum,172 in which
a group of individuals brought a First Amendment challenge to the
Department of the Army’s surveillance of civil rights activities in the
aftermath of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination.  The Army had
harvested information on political activities from news reports and
from intelligence agents who attended public meetings.173  While
acknowledging that “constitutional violations may arise from the
deterrent, or ‘chilling,’ effect of governmental regulations that fall
short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment
rights,”174 the Court nonetheless concluded that the plaintiffs failed to
establish a cognizable First Amendment injury because “[a]llegations
of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a claim of
specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.”175
Laird was not especially clear about when government surveil-
lance (and information gathering practices more generally) will cause
a cognizable First Amendment injury.  Indeed, one view of Laird
interprets it as a very narrow, fact-specific holding based on the plain-
tiffs’ highly tenuous First Amendment injury.  The Court concluded
that the plaintiffs merely articulated “speculative apprehensiveness
that the Army may at some future date misuse the information in
171 Id. at 693.
172 408 U.S. 1.
173 Id. at 6.
174 Id. at 11.
175 Id. at 13–14.
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some way that would cause direct harm to respondents.”176  In other
words, Laird might be read to state only that naked allegations of
“speculative apprehensiveness” are insufficient to establish a cogni-
zable chilling effect.
Lower courts have interpreted Laird to mean that the mere pres-
ence of the police or recording of information at public meetings do
not constitute cognizable First Amendment injuries.177  However,
when plaintiffs have produced evidence of deterrence (as opposed to
mere allegations of discomfort or dislike), courts have found cogni-
zable First Amendment injuries.178  In addition, several courts have
distinguished Laird when the government surveillance went beyond
public meetings to closed and private meetings.179  Other courts have
distinguished Laird when plaintiffs alleged that the police not only
collected information but also used it in harmful ways.180  Therefore,
the rule in Laird can be limited to situations involving mere allega-
tions of government information gathering in public meetings without
176 Id. at 13; see also Slobogin, supra note 48, at 253–55 (offering such analysis of Laird).
177 See, e.g., Phila. Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc’y of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d
1335, 1337 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that Laird foreclosed finding “a constitutional violation
on the basis of mere police photographing and data gathering at public meetings”);
Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196, 201–02 (4th Cir. 1972) (finding alleged chilling effect of
police photography not cognizable on basis of Laird).
178 For example, in Bee See Books Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
uniformed police officers routinely were stationed in plaintiffs’ bookstores, which sold
some hard-core pornography.  The court concluded that the officers’ presence violated the
First Amendment because evidence showed that it resulted in a considerable drop in book
sales. Id. at 623–24, 626.  In Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518
(9th Cir. 1989), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents wearing bugging
devices entered churches and recorded religious services.  The INS argued that Laird con-
trolled, but the court concluded that the church had established a cognizable First Amend-
ment injury because it had alleged “a concrete, demonstrable decrease in attendance at
those worship activities.” Id. at 522.
179 See, e.g., Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766, 770–71 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(noting that government informers infiltrating groups, urging members to engage in illegal
activities, and keeping dossiers on members “would seem by far to exceed the passive
observational activities” upheld in Laird); White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 226–27, 229 (Cal.
1975) (distinguishing Laird and concluding that “[a]s a practical matter, the presence in a
university classroom of undercover officers taking notes to be preserved in police dossiers
must inevitably inhibit the exercise of free speech both by professors and students”). But
see Gordon v. Warren Consol. Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 778, 780–81 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding
that undercover agents investigating drug trafficking in high school did not create chilling
effect because “there is not a single allegation that the covert operation in and of itself
resulted in tangible consequences”).
180 Phila. Yearly Meeting, 519 F.3d at 1338–39 (finding “immediately threatened injury
to plaintiffs by way of a chilling of their rights to freedom of speech and associational
privacy” when collected information was available to nonpolice parties and was disclosed
on television); Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 115, 116–17 (N.D. Ill.
1975) (holding that allegations of wiretapping, unlawful entry, and dissemination of infor-
mation “differ greatly” from those in Laird).
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any evidence of deterrence or any indication of palpable harmful
future uses of the information.
2. Identifying Anonymous Speakers
The Supreme Court has held that restrictions on the ability to
speak anonymously violate the First Amendment.  In Talley v.
California,181 the Court held that a law prohibiting the distribution of
anonymous handbills violated the First Amendment.182  The Court
reasoned that anonymity is essential to protecting robust and uninhib-
ited speech, and it noted that the “old seditious libel cases in England
show the lengths to which government had to go to find out who was
responsible for books that were obnoxious to the rulers.”183  As the
Court declared in 1995 in reaffirming its protection of anonymity in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,184 an author’s “decision in
favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official
retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to
preserve as much of one’s privacy as possible.”185
The right to speak anonymously is implicated when the govern-
ment seeks to obtain ISP records that can identify anonymous
speakers on the Internet.186  In several lower court decisions, courts
have used heightened standards for civil subpoenas requesting the
identities of anonymous speakers.  For example, in Doe v. 2TheMart.
com Inc.,187 the court noted:
The free exchange of ideas on the Internet is driven in large part by
the ability of Internet users to communicate anonymously.  If
Internet users could be stripped of that anonymity by a civil sub-
poena enforced under the liberal rules of civil discovery, this would
have a significant chilling effect on Internet communication and
thus on basic First Amendment rights.188
181 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
182 Id. at 64–65.
183 Id.
184 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
185 Id. at 341–42; see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of
Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166 (2002) (quoting McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341–42).
186 Under the Stored Communications Act, the government can obtain customer
records at ISPs by providing “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reason-
able grounds to believe that . . . the records or other information sought, are relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”  18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B)–(C), (d) (2000).
187 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
188 Id. at 1093.
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\82-1\NYU103.txt unknown Seq: 35 13-MAR-07 13:34
146 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:112
Numerous other cases have concluded that the First Amendment
requires special, tougher standards before a subpoena can be enforced
to reveal an anonymous speaker’s identity.189
3. Curtailing the Right to Receive Ideas
A corollary to the right to free speech is the right to receive ideas.
In Stanley v. Georgia,190 the Court declared:  “It is now well estab-
lished that the Constitution protects the right to receive information
and ideas. . . .  This right to receive information and ideas, regardless
of their social worth, is fundamental to our free society.”191  Govern-
ment information gathering can target information about the ideas a
person is consuming.  Subpoenas for library or bookstore records can
reveal what books a person reads, and subpoenas to ISPs also impli-
cate the right to receive ideas.  As Julie Cohen contends, “The
freedom to read anonymously is just as much a part of our tradition,
and the choice of reading materials just as expressive of identity, as
the decision to use or withhold one’s name.”192
The Supreme Court has also held that disallowing an individual
from anonymously consuming ideas places an unconstitutional burden
on First Amendment rights.  For example, in Lamont v. Postmaster
General,193 the Court struck down on First Amendment grounds a
statute that required that foreign mail deemed “communist political
propaganda” be kept at the post office, with the addressee having to
make a special request to receive it.  The Court reasoned that having
to “request in writing that [one’s mail] be delivered” was “almost cer-
tain to have a deterrent effect.”194  Under such a system, people are
“likely to feel some inhibition in sending for literature which federal
officials have condemned as ‘communist political propaganda.’”195
189 See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(finding “limiting principals [sic]” on discoverability of defendant’s identity due to “legiti-
mate and valuable right to participate in online forums anonymously”); Doe No. 1 v.
Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005) (holding that, because of potential chilling effect of
low standard, defamation plaintiffs must satisfy “summary judgement” standard to obtain
anonymous defendant’s identity); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (offering guidelines for balancing First Amendment right
to anonymous speech against plaintiff’s right to assert claims against actionable anonymous
conduct).
190 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
191 Id. at 564 (citation omitted).
192 Cohen, supra note 43, at 1012; see also Blitz, supra note 44, at 800 (“It is now well
established that the First Amendment protects not only the rights of people to engage in
speech but also the right of audiences to receive it.” (citing Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564)).
193 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
194 Id. at 307.
195 Id.
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Several lower courts have required a “compelling interest” for
any subpoena pertaining to First Amendment activities, such as one’s
reading habits or speech.196  For example, in In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena to Kramerbooks & Afterwords Inc.,197 Independent Counsel
Kenneth Starr, in his investigation of President Bill Clinton, subpoe-
naed records relating to Monica Lewinsky’s book purchases at
Kramerbooks and Barnes & Noble.  Kramerbooks challenged the
subpoena on First Amendment grounds.  The court concluded that
First Amendment activities, namely the “right to receive information
and ideas,” were implicated by the subpoenas.198  Accordingly, in
order to determine whether a “compelling need” was present, the
court ordered that the Office of Independent Counsel submit a “filing
describing its need for the materials sought by the subpoenas to
Kramerbooks and Barnes & Noble and the connection between the
information sought and the grand jury investigation . . . .”199
4. Revealing Associational Ties to Political Groups
Government information gathering about people’s associations
can also trigger First Amendment scrutiny.  The Supreme Court has
concluded that the First Amendment protects “expressive” associa-
tion, which is association for the purpose of engaging in expressive
activities.200  In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,201 the Court
held that the NAACP could not be compelled to publicly disclose the
names and addresses of its members.  The Court declared that
“freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Pro-
196 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 78 F.3d 1307, 1312 (8th Cir. 1996) (“A
grand jury subpoena will be enforced despite a First Amendment challenge if the govern-
ment can demonstrate a compelling interest in . . . the information sought . . . .” (citation
omitted)); A Grand Jury Witness v. United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 776 F.2d
1099, 1102–03 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting “well established” standard that government interests
must be “compelling” and “sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringe-
ment” when grand jury subpoena implicates First Amendment rights (citations omitted));
Grandbouche v. United States (In re Grand Subpoena to First Nat’l Bank), 701 F.2d 115,
119 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that if enforcement of subpoena will chill freedom of associa-
tion, government “must show a compelling need to obtain documents identifying peti-
tioners’ members” (citation omitted)).
197 26 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1599 (D.D.C. 1998).
198 Id. at 1600 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)).
199 Id. at 1601.  The case was settled before the court engaged in the requisite First
Amendment balancing.
200 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (recognizing “expressive associa-
tion” as distinct from “intimate association”); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568–70 (1995) (finding marching in parade to
be constitutionally protected expressive association).
201 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom
of speech.”202  Noting that there is a “vital relationship between
freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations,”203 the Court
went on to conclude that exposing members’ identities would subject
them “to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical
coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”204
The Court reached similar conclusions in Bates v. City of Little
Rock205 and Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee,206
cases also involving the compulsory public disclosure of NAACP
membership lists.  In Buckley v. Valeo,207 the Court applied “exacting
scrutiny” to disclosure requirements for certain campaign contribu-
tions and expenditures under the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971.208  Although ultimately upholding the law as to contribution
limits, the Court noted that “[i]t is undoubtedly true that public disclo-
sure of contributions to candidates and political parties will deter
some individuals who otherwise might contribute.”209
The Court has also held that First Amendment rights are impli-
cated when information about an individual’s associations is com-
pelled by the government, even if no public disclosure is threatened.
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,210 the Court held that a state attorney
general could not compel a witness before a state legislature to
divulge his associations with particular Communist organizations:
“Merely to summon a witness and compel him, against his will, to dis-
close the nature of his past expressions and associations is a measure
of governmental interference in these matters.”211  In Shelton v.
Tucker,212 moreover, the Court invalidated a statute that required
instructors to file an annual affidavit “listing without limitation every
organization to which [they had] belonged or regularly contributed
within the preceding five years” as a condition of employment in a
202 Id. at 460 (citations omitted).
203 Id. at 462.
204 Id.
205 361 U.S. 516, 523–24 (1960) (holding that disclosure of NAACP membership lists
“would work a significant interference with the freedom of association of their members”
because of “uncontroverted” likelihood of ensuing “harassment and threats of bodily
harm”).
206 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) (finding that publicizing NAACP membership information
during committee hearing would amount to “a substantial abridgment of associational
freedom”).
207 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
208 Id. at 64.
209 Id. at 68.
210 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
211 Id. at 250.
212 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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state school or college.213  The Court concluded that “[t]he statute’s
comprehensive interference with associational freedom goes far
beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State’s legitimate
inquiry into the fitness and competency of its teachers.”214  In partic-
ular, the Court was troubled by the breadth of the inquiry, which
extended to “every conceivable kind of associational tie—social, pro-
fessional, political, avocational, or religious.”215  The Court reached a
similar conclusion in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona,216 finding that
questioning a bar applicant about membership in any organization
“that advocate[d] overthrow of the United States Government by
force or violence” infringed on freedom of association.217
These Supreme Court cases all involved direct interrogation, but
their logic could apply to searches and subpoenas for papers and doc-
uments.  Lower federal courts applying Baird, Sweezy, and Shelton
have found that subpoenas for associational information implicate the
First Amendment.218  The case law thus suggests that the government
creates indirect burdens on free association when it seeks information
about a person’s expressive associations.  The mere collection of infor-
mation on association by the government can be sufficient to establish
a First Amendment injury.
213 Id. at 480, 490.
214 Id. at 490.
215 Id. at 488.
216 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
217 Id. at 5.  “[W]hen a State attempts to make inquiries about a person’s beliefs or
associations, its power is limited by the First Amendment.  Broad and sweeping state
inquiries into these protected areas, as Arizona has engaged in here, discourage citizens
from exercising rights protected by the Constitution.” Id. at 6.
218 See, e.g., Grandbouche v. United States (In re Grand Subpoena to First Nat’l Bank),
701 F.2d 115, 119 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding that First Amendment was implicated by grand
jury subpoena to bank for account records of two antitaxation groups because “the consti-
tutionally protected right, freedom to associate freely and anonymously, will be chilled
equally whether the associational information is compelled from the organization itself or
from third parties”); Local 1814 v. Waterfront Comm’n, 667 F.2d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 1981)
(concluding that subpoena for list of contributors to political committee violated First
Amendment because “compelled disclosure of the Fund’s contributors under the circum-
stances of this case would give rise to a chilling effect similar to the one recognized by the
Supreme Court in Shelton v. Tucker”); United States v. Citizens State Bank, 612 F.2d 1091,
1094 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding that antitax group’s allegations that subpoena to bank for
account records caused “adverse effects” on its “organizational and fundraising activities”
established “prima facie showing of arguable First Amendment infringement”); Paton v.
LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 865, 870 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that “mail cover”—recording of
information appearing on outside of envelopes—violated individual’s First Amendment
rights because “factfinder reasonably might conclude that the FBI investigation adversely
affected Paton’s standing in school and in her community”).
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5. Subpoenas to the Press
First Amendment doctrine also protects against government
information gathering directed toward the press, though the limits of
this protection are still unclear.  In Branzburg v. Hayes,219 journalists
raised First Amendment challenges to subpoenas to testify before
grand juries about the identities of several sources for their stories.
While the Court concluded journalists did not enjoy a special First
Amendment privilege to refuse to testify before the grand jury about
their sources,220  it also noted:
[N]ews gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,
and grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in
good faith, would pose wholly different issues for resolution under
the First Amendment. . . . Grand juries are subject to judicial con-
trol and subpoenas to motions to quash.  We do not expect courts
will forget that grand juries must operate within the limits of the
First Amendment as well as the Fifth.221
The majority opinion in Branzburg thus acknowledged the First
Amendment values implicated by forcing reporters to testify before
grand juries but refused to create an explicit reporter’s privilege.
Swing voter Justice Powell’s concurrence offered up an interpre-
tation of the majority holding that suggested somewhat stronger First
Amendment protections.  Powell noted that the “Court does not hold
that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without
constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safe-
guarding their sources.”222  Rather, “the courts will be available to
newsmen under circumstances where legitimate First Amendment
interests require protection.”223  He went on to argue that privilege
claims should be assessed “by the striking of a proper balance
between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give
relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.”224
Despite the conflict between the majority opinion and the con-
currence,225 the “overwhelming numbers of state and federal courts
219 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
220 Id. at 682–83 (“[T]he First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental bur-
dening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of
general applicability.”).
221 Id. at 707–08.
222 Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
223 Id. at 710.
224 Id.
225 Subsequent decisions have done little to clarify the scope of the First Amendment
privilege for journalists. C. THOMAS DIENES, LEE LEVINE & ROBERT C. LIND, NEWS-
GATHERING AND THE LAW § 16.06, at 930 (3d ed. 2005).  In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153
(1979), the Court held that in defamation cases, the First Amendment does not restrict
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have interpreted Branzburg, and the subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions that have had occasion to revisit it, as recognizing in the First
Amendment a qualified journalists’ privilege.”226  Accordingly, the
majority of courts balance the interest in protecting freedom of the
press against the interest in compelling testimony about confidential
sources to determine whether compelling a journalist to testify passes
constitutional muster.227
* * *
Taken together, these many lines of First Amendment cases
establish a foundation for First Amendment protection against certain
instances of government information gathering.  The cases recognize
that government information gathering through surveillance, sub-
poenas, questioning, and other techniques can chill freedom of
speech, consumption of ideas, association, and other rights.  First
Amendment criminal procedure thus has substantial roots in existing
First Amendment doctrine.
III
CONTOURS AND APPLICATIONS
As I have shown, current criminal procedure leaves much First
Amendment activity unprotected.228  I have argued that based on its
history, values, and doctrine, the First Amendment should serve as an
independent source of procedure to protect expressive and associa-
tional activity from government information gathering.  Any theory of
First Amendment criminal procedure will have to determine when the
First Amendment applies to a government investigation and, if it
applies, what types of procedures are required.  In this part, I set forth
an approach to First Amendment criminal procedure, and I explore
how this approach would work by applying it to several examples.
A. When Should the First Amendment Apply?
When should government information gathering trigger First
Amendment protection?  The answer depends upon the resolution of
two questions:
plaintiffs from “inquiring into the editorial processes of those responsible for the publica-
tion.” Id. at 155.
226 DIENES ET AL., supra note 225, § 16.07, at 948.
227 Id. § 16.07, at 948–50 (arguing that “majority approach” of lower courts is exempli-
fied by Second Circuit, which has held that journalist’s right to protect confidential sources
can only be outweighed by overriding and compelling interest).
228 See supra Part I.
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(1) Does the government information gathering affect activities
that fall within the boundaries of the First Amendment?
(2) Does it have a chilling effect upon such activities?
1. First Amendment Boundaries
In determining whether the First Amendment regulates an
instance of government information gathering, the first question is
whether it implicates an activity that falls within the boundaries of the
First Amendment.  To make this determination, we cannot simply ask
whether a particular law enforcement investigation implicates expres-
sive or associational activity, as nearly all law enforcement investiga-
tions do.  Instead, we must ask whether First Amendment values are
implicated.
The First Amendment currently covers a veritable kingdom of
territory, so it is often not implausible to find the First Amendment
implicated by a wide array of government conduct.  Almost every
search or seizure could be understood to have some dimension that
might involve a First Amendment activity because all human interac-
tion involves communication and association.229  In the end, the First
Amendment could swallow up all of criminal procedure.
Moreover, some commentators have argued that First Amend-
ment coverage is not only broad, but cannot be contained by any lim-
iting principle.  As Frederick Schauer aptly observes, “if there exists a
single theory that can explain the First Amendment’s coverage, it has
not yet been found.”230  According to Schauer:
Little case law and not much more commentary explain why the
content-based restrictions of speech in the Securities Act of 1933,
the Sherman Antitrust Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the
Uniform Commercial Code, the law of fraud, conspiracy law, the
law of evidence, and countless other areas of statutory and common
law do not, at the least, present serious First Amendment issues.231
Schauer notes that First Amendment “coverage may often be a func-
tion simply of the persistent visibility of First Amendment rhetoric,
and noncoverage may conversely be a function of the failure of such
rhetoric to take hold.”232
229 As David Cole notes, “The right of association is potentially limitless.  Virtually eve-
rything we do in society involves some degree of association with someone else.”  David
Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd:  Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of Association,
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 232.
230 Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment:  A Preliminary Explora-
tion of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1786 (2004).
231 Id. at 1768.
232 Id. at 1807.
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To overcome this problem, First Amendment criminal procedure
should adopt the approach suggested by Robert Post and look to
whether a particular government activity implicates First Amendment
values.233  Post argues that not all communications are expressive in
ways that promote First Amendment values.  For example, he
observes that navigation charts “are clearly media in which speakers
successfully communicate particularized messages,” but “when inaccu-
rate charts cause accidents, courts do not conceptualize suits against
the charts’ authors as raising First Amendment questions.”234
According to Post, to determine the scope of the First Amendment we
must examine “the social contexts that envelop and give constitutional
significance to acts of communication.”235
Thus, in determining whether an instance of government infor-
mation gathering implicates the First Amendment, we cannot merely
look to whether a particular instance of government information gath-
ering has any possible expressive or associational dimensions, but also
to whether the expressive or associational dimension implicates the
values that the First Amendment protects.  The First Amendment pro-
tects communication, association, and other activities when they
implicate belief, discourse, or relationships of a political, cultural, or
religious nature.  The Supreme Court itself has recognized that some
expressive and associational activity is less central to, or not protected
at all by, the First Amendment.  Obscenity,236 fighting words,237 and
child pornography238 are considered low-value speech and receive
diminished First Amendment protection.  The Court has also not con-
sidered conspiracy, quid pro quo sexual harassment, insider trading,
and other forms of communicative activity to be protected speech.239
233 Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1255
(1995) (“First Amendment analysis is relevant only when the values served by the First
Amendment are implicated.”).
234 Id. at 1254.
235 Id. at 1255.
236 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36–37 (1973) (holding that obscene material is not
generally protected by First Amendment and can be regulated even absent demonstration
that it is without redeeming social value). But see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559
(1969) (holding that First Amendment prohibits states from criminalizing mere private
possession of obscene material).
237 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). But see R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (holding that First Amendment requires that restrictions on
use of fighting words, as well as on other low-value speech, be viewpoint neutral).
238 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982).
239 I am not defending as a normative matter the Court’s existing doctrinal categoriza-
tions of speech and nonspeech; rather, I am merely pointing out that the Court has recog-
nized that not every instance of communication and association falls within the scope of
the First Amendment.
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Looking to First Amendment values prevents the First Amend-
ment from unduly limiting government information gathering in other
contexts.  For example, government collection of business records
would generally not trigger First Amendment restrictions.  In the days
when Boyd barred most paper searches, the Court in Hale v.
Henkel240 concluded that subpoenas for corporate documents were
not restricted by the Fourth Amendment.241  The First Amendment
also does not apply to a large dimension of business regulation, even
when companies must disclose records to regulators.  In other words,
First Amendment law has adopted, at least in part, the Fourth
Amendment distinction between personal and business papers.
In sum, First Amendment criminal procedure protections should
not apply whenever any expressive or associational activity is involved
but only when such activity implicates values protected by the First
Amendment.
2. Chilling Effect
Even where government information gathering implicates First
Amendment values, First Amendment procedural protections should
only apply if there is a discernible “chilling effect.”  As with deter-
mining whether an activity falls within the scope of the First Amend-
ment, the challenge is defining the boundaries of “chilling effect.”
Schauer has observed that all government action can have some chil-
ling effect; “[w]hat we must look for is some way of determining under
what circumstances the inevitable chilling effect becomes great
enough to require judicial invalidation of legislative enactments” or
executive information gathering.242  We need an approach for distin-
guishing between cognizable and noncognizable chilling effects.  The
240 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
241 See id. at 74.  But cf. Slobogin, supra note 58, at 815–17 (noting that although many
cases in first half of twentieth century, including Hale, allowed very low standard for sub-
poenas for business papers, Hale suggested that subpoenas for private records might
require higher standard).  According to William Stuntz, the Hale approach was a cheat, a
way to “keep Boyd and Entick but cabin them with illogical boundaries, making the pro-
tection non-threatening (or at least non-fatal) to the emergence of the regulatory state.”
Stuntz, supra note 107, at 432.  However, although the Court’s boundaries do not follow
strict logic, they are not entirely indefensible.  After all, it is a fiction to call a corporation a
“person,” and once one fiction is created, other departures from a strictly logical approach
might be needed to cabin the fiction within logical boundaries.  In other words, the fact
that the Court held that a corporation should enjoy some of the rights that persons have
under the Constitution does not require the Court to conclude that corporations should
have all of those rights.
242 Schauer, supra note 170, at 701.
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chilling effect cases unfortunately do not provide a clear approach to
the problem.243
Determining the existence of a chilling effect is complicated by
the difficulty of defining and identifying deterrence.  It is hard to mea-
sure the deterrence caused by a chilling effect because it is impossible
to determine with certainty what people would have said or done in
the absence of the government activity.  Often, the primary evidence
will be a person’s own assertions that she was chilled, but merely
accepting such assertions at face value would allow anyone claiming a
chilling effect to establish one.  At the same time, demanding empir-
ical evidence of deterrence is impractical because it will often be
impossible to produce.
In order to deal with this problem, courts have allowed some
speculation about deterrence but have required more than mere
apprehensiveness.  While the case law is somewhat muddled, the
Supreme Court is prepared to recognize a cognizable chilling effect
from the imposition of civil damages, as in defamation cases,244 or
from public disclosure of information gathered by the government, as
sometimes occurs in association cases.245  Although in some cases
exposure of information to the government alone can trigger a chilling
effect—for example, in cases involving anonymous expression or
associations246—in many other instances, as with surveillance of
public meetings, such exposure is not, by itself, sufficient.247
In freedom of association cases, the Court may be especially
willing to find a chilling effect.  In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson,248 the NAACP did not need to proffer statistics about
declining membership.  Instead, it could point to palpable conse-
quences that were likely (though not certain) to follow from the gov-
ernment’s actions.249  In other freedom of association cases, the Court
has concluded that mere government collection of information about
associations was sufficient to create a cognizable First Amendment
injury.250
243 Jonathan R. Siegel, Note, Chilling Injuries as a Basis for Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 905,
916 (1989) (“Laird v. Tatum did not clarify the difference between objective and subjective
chills, and the lower courts have not reached agreement on the meanings of these terms.”).
244 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (arguing that although
libel can be restricted under First Amendment, “breathing space” must be provided so as
not to chill protected speech).
245 See supra Part II.B.4.
246 See supra Parts II.B.2–3.
247 See supra Part II.B.1.
248 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
249 Id. at 462–63.
250 E.g., Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960).
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At a minimum, use of previously gathered information in a crim-
inal prosecution would be sufficient to show deterrence.  In many
cases involving government information gathering about First
Amendment activities, the government is collecting data to generate
evidence for use in criminal cases.  In Dombrowski v. Pfister,251 the
Court found First Amendment standing based on the threat of crim-
inal prosecution because “[t]he chilling effect on the exercise of First
Amendment rights may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaf-
fected by the prospects of its success or failure.”252
Dombrowski involved a statute that directly targeted free expres-
sion and political activity,253 but similar chilling effects can also occur
when the government is investigating non-speech-related crimes.
Many government investigations implicating First Amendment inter-
ests will be for the prosecution of crimes such as conspiracy, murder,
robbery, or computer hacking, and not for crimes based on the ille-
gality of speech or association.  Even where the criminalized activity is
not itself expressive or associational, there may be a chilling effect
sufficient to trigger First Amendment procedural protections.  People
might be chilled in writing or saying certain things, owning certain
books, visiting particular websites, or communicating with particular
individuals, groups, and organizations if the government can obtain
and use information about these activities in a criminal prosecution.
A person might not want to purchase a book about making bombs or
flying a plane if it will be used against him or her in a trial for con-
spiracy to engage in terrorist acts.  A person might not go to various
religious or political websites if she knew that the government might
use this as evidence in such a case.  Even if there were no criminal
case brought, the fear that engaging in First Amendment activities
might trigger an arrest or a potential criminal probe might be suffi-
ciently daunting to chill such activities.  Whether criminal investiga-
tion alone is sufficient to create a chilling effect will depend upon the
specific facts of each case, including whether the person being investi-
gated can demonstrate deterrence of First Amendment activities.
In contrast, certain government information gathering activities
for criminal investigations may not have a chilling effect.  Under
existing First Amendment doctrine, when the government merely
gathers information that is widely exposed to the public, there is no
251 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
252 Id. at 487.
253 Id. at 492–95 (striking down Louisiana’s Subversive Activities and Communist Con-
trol Law, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:358–374 (Cum. Supp. 1962), which required members
of “Communist Front Organizations” to register with authorities).
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cognizable chilling effect.254  For example, suppose a person publishes
a political manifesto, and an FBI agent purchases it in a bookstore.255
Although this is government information gathering for the purpose of
finding out about the person’s speech, the First Amendment should
not apply because the book was written for public consumption.  In
contrast, a violation of the First Amendment might occur if law
enforcement authorities read private writings that were shared with a
small group of people, but not with the public at large.  Similarly, lim-
ited surveillance of activities visible to the public would most likely
not trigger First Amendment protection, but a more systematic cam-
paign of public surveillance might present a different situation.
Criminal investigations and prosecutions are not the only poten-
tial source of chilling effects.  In many instances, the government
engages in broad information gathering that is not directly tied to a
concrete penalty or consequence, but which still may chill speech.  For
example, people might fear that if the government learns about their
speech or associations, they will wind up on a terrorist watch list.
However, they might never know if they are in fact on a watch list,
and the consequences of being placed on such a list might be unclear.
Being placed on a watch list might result in extra airline screening, or
it might have no impact on the individual at all.  Or the information
could go into a government database for some unknown future use
when the time is ripe.
These uses are speculative, and they present a difficult case for
chilling effect analysis.  Courts might conclude that people should wait
to see how the information is used; if the government uses their infor-
mation against them, defendants would then be able to allege a cogni-
zable chilling effect.  However, this ignores the central premise of the
chilling effect doctrine—that many will not be willing to accept the
risk and will instead simply change their behavior.  Therefore, even if
the information is never used at trial, uncertainty about the govern-
ment’s intentions may still deter First Amendment activities.  The gov-
ernment might argue that it must keep secret the uses of the
information it gathers, but this only exacerbates the problem—lack of
transparency makes it especially difficult for individuals to allege a
sufficiently concrete chilling effect.  By collecting data and obscuring
its potential uses, the government can effectively limit people’s ability
to assert their First Amendment rights by making it impossible for
them to establish a sufficient chill.
254 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 3, 6 (1972).
255 This hypothetical is based on Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985), where the
Court concluded that the mere purchase of a book by a law enforcement official does not
implicate either the Fourth Amendment or the First. Id. at 468–70.
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The First Amendment concept of overbreadth might provide a
solution to the problems presented by situations involving such large-
scale information gathering programs.  According to the Supreme
Court, “a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities con-
stitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.”256  Overbreadth doctrine relaxes the normal
standing rules to allow people to bring suit without having to show
that the law is unconstitutional as applied to them.257  To challenge a
statute as overbroad, an individual need only show that some applica-
tion of the law is unconstitutional and might chill the speech of parties
not before the court.  For a statute “to be facially challenged on over-
breadth grounds” there “must be a realistic danger that the statute
itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment pro-
tections of parties not before the Court.”258
The concept of overbreadth in connection with government infor-
mation gathering has a close analogue in the Fourth Amendment’s
concept of particularity, which mandates procedures to prevent over-
broad searches.  The Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant must
describe with “particular[ity] . . . the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”259  The Framers included the particu-
larity requirement because they wanted to restrict general warrants
and writs of assistance.260  Writs of assistance were pernicious because
they allowed “sweeping searches and seizures without any evidentiary
basis.”261  General warrants “resulted in ‘ransacking’ and seizure of
the personal papers of political dissidents, authors, and printers of
seditious libel.”262  Overbreadth is therefore not a concept foreign to
criminal procedure.
256 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
257 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 (1940) (holding that after arrest and conviction
under overbroad statute, “[a]n accused . . . does not have to sustain the burden of demon-
strating that the State could not constitutionally have written a different and specific
statute covering his activities”).
258 Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984).
259 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
260 Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1994).  Indeed, as Maclin notes, “Everyone . . . agrees that the
Framers opposed general warrants.” Id. at 9; see also LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 157–58 (1999) (discussing history of colonial opposition to writs of assis-
tance and that history’s connection to adoption of Fourth Amendment).
261 Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitu-
tional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 82 (1988).
262 See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38 (1979); see also
LEVY, supra note 260, at 150 (describing British use of general warrants and its role in
development of Fourth Amendment).
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We can adapt overbreadth doctrine to address the problem of
proving a chilling effect when the government engages in large-scale
information gathering initiatives.  In this context, litigants could chal-
lenge an information gathering program as overbroad, regardless of
whether they could prove that they personally suffered a concrete
chilling effect.  Instead, courts would determine whether the govern-
ment program sweeps so broadly that it captures a substantial amount
of First Amendment activity.  A program that sweeps in a great deal
of First Amendment activity will be deemed unconstitutionally over-
broad if not narrowly tailored to a substantial government interest.
Allowing such challenges will have the secondary benefit of bringing
greater transparency to information gathering programs, as the gov-
ernment will be forced to justify its activities and the breadth of their
scope.
In sum, to determine whether First Amendment procedural pro-
tections will apply, courts should first look to see whether the activity
at issue is within the scope of the First Amendment.  Next, courts
must determine whether the government information gathering has a
cognizable chilling effect on First Amendment activity.  Criminal pros-
ecutions will almost always have some chilling effect.  In situations
involving large-scale programs, litigants should be able to bring over-
breadth challenges without having to prove individual chilling effect.
B. What Level of Protection Should the First Amendment Require?
Even if an instance of government information gathering triggers
First Amendment protection, collection of the data will not necessa-
rily be prohibited.  Rather, the First Amendment will require the gov-
ernment to demonstrate (1) a significant interest in gathering the
information and (2) that the manner of collection is narrowly tailored
to achieving that interest.  As I will discuss in this Section, the use of a
warrant supported by probable cause will, in most cases, suffice to
satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement.  In other words, in cases
where the First Amendment applies, it often will require procedures
similar to those required by the Fourth Amendment.
1. First Amendment Information Gathering Procedures
If the First Amendment is implicated by government information
gathering, how should it regulate the government’s activities?  Under
one possible approach, the First Amendment might serve as an abso-
lute prohibition, preventing the government from gathering data
involving First Amendment activities.  For example, Michael Mello
and Paul Perkins have argued that the contents of a diary “are entitled
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to absolute protection from governmental intrusion—regardless of
how much probable cause the government possesses, and regardless
of how many procedurally valid search warrants the government
obtain[s].”263
However, such an approach is impractical.  First Amendment
protection involves balancing,264 and it need not absolutely bar the
government from engaging in information gathering.  In general, First
Amendment balancing begins by assessing the strength of the govern-
ment interest.  If the government interest is compelling or substantial,
the court then analyzes whether the government action is sufficiently
narrowly tailored to the achievement of the government interest.265
Under my approach, the same standard would apply to govern-
ment investigations.  When the First Amendment applies, the govern-
ment information gathering would only be upheld if it serves a
substantial government interest and employs narrowly tailored means
to achieve that interest.  The First Amendment would rarely com-
pletely ban a particular instance of government information gathering.
Instead, the court would balance the need for unencumbered govern-
ment information gathering against the impact on First Amendment
rights.  If the government interest is substantial, the First Amendment
would mandate procedures that must be followed in order for the
information gathering to take place, such as obtaining a warrant.
On the first question, the government must be able to establish a
substantial interest in the information or it will be restricted by the
First Amendment from engaging in its investigation.  For example,
investigating serious crimes and preventing terrorism would qualify as
substantial.  This part of the balancing approach would root out gov-
ernment information gathering initiatives that lack a compelling pur-
pose.  It would also force the government to be more transparent
about the reasons for its information gathering activities.
A court would then analyze whether the means used to gather the
information were narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s
interest.  Courts would look to whether the information gathering
effectively furthers the government’s interest, and whether the proce-
263 Michael Mello & Paul Perkins, Ted Kaczynski’s Diary, 22 VT. L. REV. 83, 90 (1997).
264 It is worth noting that the Fourth Amendment also involves balancing.  The govern-
ment can search nearly anything after meeting the appropriate threshold. But see Winston
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (surgical removal of bullet in suspect’s chest, with warrant
supported by probable cause, was nonetheless unreasonable under Fourth Amendment).
Indeed, the government can even search the intimate sanctuaries of a person’s home with a
warrant supported by probable cause.
265 For a detailed discussion of First Amendment balancing, see Daniel J. Solove, The
Virtues of Knowing Less:  Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J.
967, 981–89 (2003).
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dural safeguards and judicial oversight available are sufficient to pre-
vent abuse without rendering the investigation ineffective.266
In many cases, if applicable, the First Amendment would require
that information be gathered pursuant to a warrant and probable
cause.  Warrants and probable cause have several attributes that will
help safeguard First Amendment activities.  First, warrants prevent
government information gathering from becoming excessively broad
by requiring that government officials specify with “particular[ity] . . .
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”267
Second, warrants require judicial oversight of the executive branch’s
law enforcement activities, thus serving as a check against interference
with First Amendment activities.  Warrants require the government to
justify its search in advance, thereby preventing it from “dreaming up
post hoc rationalizations.”268  By the same token, advance justification
for information gathering prevents the government from searching
people because of disfavored speech or associations in order to
uncover evidence that could be used to prosecute them for unrelated
offenses.  Third, by requiring that government officials “document
their requests for authorization,” warrants force officials to exercise
more circumspection in deciding when to gather information.269
Fourth, the probable cause requirement prevents information gath-
ering based on the mere hunch or whim of government officials; it
prevents the government from searching people merely because their
associations, expression, or beliefs are unpopular.270  Under my First
Amendment approach, law enforcement officials would apply for a
search warrant in much the same way they do under the Fourth
Amendment.  In other words, we would see the birth of what might be
called the “First Amendment warrant.”
Some might argue that a warrant requirement would not ade-
quately protect First Amendment interests.  In fact, a case decided in
2002 by the Colorado Supreme Court directly examined this issue.  In
266 Nadine Strossen suggests importing a “least intrusive alternative” analysis into
Fourth Amendment law, which, she argues, would protect a wide range of constitutional
rights such as free speech, substantive due process privacy, procedural due process, equal
protection, and more. See Strossen, supra note 109, at 1176–77, 1210.  The “narrow tai-
loring” requirement I propose is less stringent than the least intrusive alternative analysis,
which is typically employed in cases involving strict scrutiny.
267 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
268 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  FIRST PRIN-
CIPLES 39 (1997).
269 Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1, 17 (1991).
270 Probable cause requires that the government have “reasonably trustworthy informa-
tion” that the search will turn up evidence of a crime.  Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175–76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
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Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton,271 police officers searching a
methamphetamine lab seized two “how to” books about operating
drug laboratories.  The officers also found an envelope and invoice
from the Tattered Cover bookstore and subsequently obtained a
search warrant to examine the bookstore’s records for the books the
suspect purchased.  The bookstore challenged the warrant under the
First Amendment and the Colorado Constitution.  The Colorado
Supreme Court agreed that the warrant was not enforceable and
should not have been issued.272  The court reasoned that gathering
information about reading habits infringes “the First Amendment
rights of customers and bookstores because compelled disclosure of
book-buying records threatens to destroy the anonymity upon which
many customers depend.”273  The court held that the Colorado Con-
stitution requires that “law enforcement officials must make a height-
ened showing of their need for the innocent bookstore’s customer
purchase records.”274  The court then rejected the warrant because the
gathered evidence was not sufficiently important to the prosecution’s
case to justify the chilling effect that execution of the warrant would
cause.275
While in many cases the warrant and probable cause require-
ments would adequately protect First Amendment activities, there
may be some instances when the Tattered Cover case’s approach
would be preferable.  In some circumstances, warrants will not pro-
vide the optimal protection to First Amendment activities.  Warrants
enable the police to look around in their search for particular papers,
increasing the risk that they will discover other documents.  In addi-
tion, unlike with subpoenas, people cannot challenge warrants before-
hand.  But Zurcher forecloses stronger protections than warrants
under the United States Constitution.276  Nonetheless, although war-
rants are not perfect, they still provide significant protections for First
Amendment activities.
Eugene Volokh has criticized attempts to raise the threshold
requirements for law enforcement officials to obtain information
about First Amendment activities.  Pointing out the great difficulties
in establishing an appropriate standard, he argues that a higher bar
271 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2002).
272 Id. at 1047.
273 Id. at 1053.
274 Id. at 1056.
275 Id. at 1061–63.
276 See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567 (1978) (“[W]e decline to reinterpret
the [First] Amendment to impose a general constitutional barrier against warrants to
search newspaper premises, to require resort to subpoenas as a general rule, or to demand
prior notice and hearing in connection with the issuance of search warrants.”).
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will “dramatically interfere with the investigation of many crimes and
torts, especially those that have an ideological motive.”277  Further-
more, to the extent the law requires only a marginally higher
threshold, it will not prevent chilling effects.278
Although Volokh is certainly correct to note that setting the right
standard is difficult, the warrant requirement is a workable standard
that has a proven track record.  Warrants are not so difficult to obtain
that they prevent effective government investigations, yet they still
require law enforcement officials to justify information gathering
endeavors.  The warrant requirement will subject many currently
unregulated government information gathering activities to judicial
oversight, creating accountability and preventing overreaching execu-
tive power.
2. Enforcement of First Amendment Rights
If the government gathers information in violation of the First
Amendment, what remedies should the First Amendment provide?
To start, if the government seeks to introduce improperly gathered
information in a criminal trial, the First Amendment should require
that the evidence be excluded.  This is, of course, the typical Fourth
Amendment enforcement mechanism for failure to obtain a valid war-
rant.  Information obtained in violation of the First Amendment
would be suppressed at trial, though most of the Fourth Amendment
warrant exceptions, such as exigency and consent, would apply to First
Amendment warrants as well.
Some might object that the First Amendment should not borrow
from the Fourth Amendment’s toolkit.  While warrants and probable
cause are mentioned in the Fourth Amendment, no specific proce-
dural requirement is discussed in the First.  Nor is there currently an
exclusionary rule for First Amendment violations.  However, the lack
of a textual basis under the First Amendment should not preclude
importing warrants, probable cause, the exclusionary rule, and other
concepts from the Fourth Amendment.  The Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule was shaped in Weeks v. United States and is not
based on the text of the Amendment.279  It is not at all unprecedented
for the Court to pollinate one amendment with concepts from
277 Eugene Volokh, Deterring Speech:  When Is It “McCarthyism”?  When Is It Proper?,
93 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1448 (2005).
278 See id.
279 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (arguing that unlawful seizures
“should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts”).  Morgan Cloud notes that the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule “is at least implicit in Boyd.”  Cloud, supra note 140,
at 581.
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another.  For example, in Mapp v. Ohio, the Court extended the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states,280 and justified its
holding by importing concepts from the Fifth Amendment and noting
the “intimate relation” between the Amendments.281  The Court
observed that  “[t]he philosophy of each Amendment and of each
freedom is complementary to, although not dependent upon, that of
the other in its sphere of influence—the very least that together they
assure in either sphere is that no man is to be convicted on unconstitu-
tional evidence.”282  A close relationship also exists between the First
and Fourth Amendments.  For example, Zurcher and the other
scrupulous exactitude cases explicitly look to Fourth Amendment pro-
cedures to protect First Amendment rights.283  The logic of these cases
could easily be expanded to include not only warrants and probable
cause, but also the exclusionary rule and other Fourth Amendment
protections.
Therefore, in the event that the government seeks to use informa-
tion obtained in violation of the First Amendment as evidence in a
criminal trial, the exclusionary rule could serve as a viable way to
enforce First Amendment protections.  When the government wants
to use the fruits of its information gathering in criminal trials, the
sanction of exclusion will provide the necessary incentive to seek prior
judicial approval through a warrant.
These protections, however, will not cover the many instances
where there is no criminal case brought against the person whose First
Amendment rights are infringed.  Suppose, for example, the govern-
ment subpoenas John Doe’s diary because it contains evidence that
will assist in the prosecution of another person.  Doe’s First Amend-
ment rights might be implicated, but he is not the subject of the crim-
inal probe.  In this instance, Doe should be allowed to initiate a civil
action to quash the subpoena or block the government from gathering
the information.  The court would then require the government to
make a showing of probable cause in order to obtain the information.
If Doe is not able to challenge the information gathering prior to its
occurrence, then he could seek damages in a subsequent lawsuit.
In other instances, individuals’ First Amendment rights may be
implicated by broad information gathering programs that do not result
280 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
281 Id. at 655–57 (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897)).  The Court
asked rhetorically:  “Why should not the same rule apply to what is tantamount to coerced
testimony by way of unconstitutional seizure of goods, papers, effects, documents, etc.?”
Id. at 656.
282 Id. at 657.
283 See supra Part I.D.
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in the use of data in criminal trials.  In these cases, overbreadth doc-
trine would allow individuals to sue by demonstrating that the infor-
mation gathering has a chilling effect on the exercise of First
Amendment rights.284  The First Amendment could also allow for
flexibility in crafting other remedies.  In cases involving dragnet
searches with no foreseeable threat of criminal prosecution, the exclu-
sionary rule obviously will be ineffective as a remedy.  Under these
circumstances, a suit for injunctive relief might be more appropriate.
The injunctive relief need not bring a government investigation com-
pletely to a halt.  Courts might narrow an overly broad information
gathering program rather than simply enjoin it, or impose certain min-
imization procedures.285
Making the First Amendment an independent source of criminal
procedure will thereby bring judicial scrutiny to government informa-
tion gathering that has an impact on First Amendment activities and
will force consideration of First Amendment values in the balance
between security and liberty, in the context of criminal trials and
beyond.
C. Applications
In the previous Sections, I have set forth an approach to applying
the First Amendment in the criminal procedure context.  First, courts
should determine whether the First Amendment applies, a determina-
tion that involves analyzing whether the government information
gathering implicates activity within the First Amendment’s scope of
protection and whether it has a sufficient chilling effect on the First
Amendment activity.  Second, if the First Amendment applies, courts
must determine whether the government had a significant interest in
gathering the information, and, if so, whether the process was nar-
rowly tailored to the government interest.  Under most circumstances,
this will require the government to obtain a warrant supported by
probable cause in order to collect the information.  Improperly gath-
ered data can be suppressed at trial by means of the exclusionary rule.
Beyond the criminal trial context, injunctive relief or damages might
also be available.  In this Section, I will examine some applications of
my approach.
284 See supra text accompanying notes 256–63.
285 Cf. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56–57 (1967) (discussing how electronic surveil-
lance orders can be crafted so as to be compatible with particularity requirement of Fourth
Amendment).
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1. Subpoenas for Book Records or Search Query Data
Suppose the police suspect John Doe of murdering somebody
with the use of an unusual poison.  The police issue subpoenas to
bookstores to find out whether Doe purchased any books on poison.
They also subpoena his search queries from Google to see if he did
any searches on poison.286
The bookstore records clearly fall within the boundaries of the
First Amendment because they concern the consumption of ideas.287
Internet search queries are very similar to book records in that they
involve a person’s reading habits and intellectual pursuits.  In Reno v.
ACLU,288 the Supreme Court likened the Internet to a “vast library
including millions of readily available and indexed publications.”289
The content of the Internet, the Court noted, “is as diverse as human
thought.”290
Having established that First Amendment activities are impli-
cated, the court would turn to the question of whether the govern-
ment activity will have a chilling effect on consumption of ideas.  In
this case, the police are seeking information for use in prosecuting
Doe.  Use in a criminal prosecution, under my approach, will almost
always cause a chilling effect.  In this case, use of the information in a
criminal prosecution penalizes Doe for his reading and Internet
searching.  Therefore, the First Amendment would regulate the gov-
ernment’s gathering of the information.291  If the evidence were used
at Doe’s criminal trial, Doe could suppress it because it was obtained
via an ordinary subpoena without requiring probable cause.292  If he
had notice of the subpoena, Doe could seek to quash it before its exe-
286 Search engine companies often maintain logs of which IP addresses are connected to
particular searches.  If provided with a particular IP address, these companies can produce
a list of terms searched by that user.  IP addresses can be connected to specific individuals
by obtaining ISP records about the customer accounts assigned to particular addresses.
Hansell, supra note 5; Declan McCullagh & Elinor Mills, Verbatim:  Search Firms Surveyed
on Privacy, CNET NEWS, Feb. 3, 2006, http://news.com.com/Verbatim+Search+firms+
surveyed+on+privacy/2100-1025_3-6034626.html?tag=st.prev.
In 2006, the government attempted to subpoena, inter alia, records of people’s
Internet search query activity over a two-month period in the summer of 2005.  The gov-
ernment sought queries from Yahoo, Google, MSN, and other search companies.  Google
challenged the request, but the other companies complied.  Eventually, the government
backed down significantly, asking only for 5000 search queries, but a district court denied
even the scaled-down request for search queries as unnecessary. See Gonzales v. Google,
Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 678, 679, 686 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
287 See supra Part I.A.
288 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
289 Id. at 853.
290 Id. at 852.
291 See supra Part III.A.2.
292 See supra Part III.B.2.
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cution if the police were unable to demonstrate probable cause.  In
short, the First Amendment would require that the police seek prior
judicial approval and show probable cause before requesting the data.
2. Obtaining ISP Records of an Anonymous Speaker
Suppose the FBI is investigating an organization for providing
“material support” to terrorists.293  FBI agents come across an anony-
mous blog where the blogger declares that he is a member of the
organization, expresses how much he supports the organization’s
values, and urges others to join the group.  The FBI obtains the IP
address of the blogger and issues a National Security Letter (NSL) to
the blogger’s ISP to find out his identity.  An NSL works similarly to a
subpoena, although its use often involves even fewer protections.294
With an NSL, the FBI can compel ISPs and telephone companies to
reveal customer records if they are “relevant” to a terrorism or intelli-
gence investigation.295
The use of the NSL would trigger First Amendment protections.
The information sought pertains to the blogger’s anonymous speech
and the political groups with which he associates, so First Amendment
values are implicated.296  The blogger’s political expression may be
substantially chilled by the government’s actions.  Even if the evi-
dence was not used in a criminal case against the blogger, the mere
exposure of the blogger’s identity to the government could have sig-
nificant chilling effects.  Given the blogger’s radical and unpopular
293 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a)–(b) (Supp. III 2003), amended by USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 208
(criminalizing provision of “material support” to terrorists, including “financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance,” among other things).
294 The FBI can obtain an individual’s financial records using an NSL if it:
certifies in writing to the financial institution that such records are sought for
foreign counterintelligence purposes to protect against international terrorism
or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a
United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities pro-
tected by the [F]irst [A]mendment to the Constitution of the United States.
12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (Supp. III 2003).  The Fair Credit Reporting Act provides for
NSLs that allow the FBI to obtain “the names and addressees of all financial institu-
tions . . . at which a customer maintains or has maintained an account,” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681u(a) (Supp. III 2003), as well as “identifying information respecting a consumer,
limited to name, address, former addresses, places of employment, or former places of
employment.” Id. § 1681u(b).  According to one estimate, 30,000 NSLs are issued every
year.  Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny; In Hunt for Terrorists, Bureau Examines
Records of Ordinary Americans, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A1.
295 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2000 & Supp. III 2003), amended by USA PATRIOT Improvement
and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 213.
296 See supra Part I.B.
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beliefs, she might be speaking anonymously precisely in order to
shield her identity from the government.
Some might contend that the NSL’s built-in safeguards for First
Amendment activity are sufficient to satisfy the First Amendment’s
demands.  Most NSL provisions, including the one for ISP records,
require that the FBI certify that the records are “relevant to an
authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation
of a United States person is not conducted solely on the basis of activi-
ties protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment to the Constitution of the
United States.”297  This provision, however, is far too narrow.  Hardly
any investigations are conducted “solely” on the basis of First Amend-
ment activities.  Law enforcement officials will invariably argue that
their investigation is based at least in some part on criminal activity.
The focus of the inquiry should not be on whether the investigations
are targeted exclusively to First Amendment activities but on whether
the investigations have a chilling effect on such activities.  Therefore,
the First Amendment provisions of the NSL are not sufficiently pro-
tective of First Amendment rights, and the warrant requirement
would apply.
3. Collecting Phone Call Records
In Smith v. Maryland,298 the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to pen register data.299  Accordingly, lists
of phone numbers that people dial and logs of the numbers of
incoming calls are not protected by the Fourth Amendment, although
they are given minimal statutory protection.300  The USA PATRIOT
Act extends this same minimal protection to e-mail headers and
routing information (such as IP addresses).301  Whether this minimal
protection is sufficient to comply with the Constitution is an open
question since the Court has not addressed whether Smith v.
297 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (Supp. III 2003); see also 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (Supp. III
2003) (similar language).  The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (2000), also provides
some First Amendment protection, requiring that agencies shall “maintain no record
describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless
expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained
or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.” Id.
298 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
299 Id. at 745–46.
300 Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2000) (requiring court order to obtain pen reg-
ister information upon showing that such information “is relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation”).
301 USA PATRIOT Act § 216, 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (Supp. III 2003).
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Maryland applies to e-mail headers or IP addresses, though such an
interpretation is arguably possible.302
Although the Supreme Court has focused on the Fourth Amend-
ment, obtaining pen register data without a warrant potentially vio-
lates the First Amendment.  A log of incoming and outgoing calls can
be used to trace channels of communication.  It is relatively easy to
link a phone number to a person or organization.  Pen registers can
reveal associational ties, since association in contemporary times often
occurs by way of telephone or e-mail.  As David Cole argues, modern
communications technology has made association possible without
physical assembly.303  For example, if the government scrutinized the
phone logs of the main office of the Communist Party, it might dis-
cover many of the Party’s members.  The information would not be
equivalent to a membership list, but it would probably include identi-
fying data about countless individuals who would not want the gov-
ernment to discover their connection to the Communist Party.  If the
government were to examine the phone logs or e-mail headers of a
particular individual, it might discover that the individual contacted
particular organizations that the individual wants to keep private.  The
pen register information, therefore, implicates First Amendment
values.
To make the First Amendment analysis more concrete, consider
the following hypothetical case:  A domestic political group known as
the Terrorist Sympathizers Association seeks to demonstrate that
although violent means are wrongheaded, the underlying political
causes of terrorists have merit.  The FBI suspects that a few members
might be providing assistance to terrorists, and it wants to identify the
group’s members so it can investigate them more thoroughly.  Under
the very lax standard of the Pen Register Act, the government certi-
fies that “the information likely to be obtained by such installation
and use [of a pen register] is relevant to an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion.”304  With the pen register order, it obtains from the phone com-
pany a log of all the incoming and outgoing calls to the group’s office
so it can identify the individuals who have been in contact with the
group.
302 But see Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1403–09 (2004) (arguing that Smith and similar third-party cases
should not be extended to communications held by service provider); Deirdre K. Mulligan,
Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications:  A Critical Perspective on the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1576–82 (2004) (arguing
that there are several limiting principles in business record cases like Smith that prevent
their application to e-mail communication).
303 Cole, supra note 229, at 226.
304 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a).
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In this hypothetical, association with the group would fall within
the boundaries of the First Amendment because it is association “for
the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of griev-
ances, and the exercise of religion.”305  The association here is for the
“pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational,
religious, and cultural ends.”306
As for chilling effect, this is a criminal investigation for the poten-
tial purpose of prosecuting some of the group’s members.  People will
likely be chilled from associating with the group if they are identified
as members.  The First Amendment would require a warrant sup-
ported by probable cause to obtain the phone logs.
Suppose instead that the NSA wants to obtain the phone call logs
of everybody in the United States so that it can feed the data into its
computers to determine who has called phone numbers associated
with known terrorists or terrorist organizations.  It is unclear how the
government intends to use the information, and therefore it is difficult
to demonstrate that the data collection will create a chilling effect.  If
the information were used to prosecute individuals, this would clearly
chill some telephone communications.  But in the hypothetical posed,
the NSA is merely planning to analyze the data.  It may use it for
myriad purposes, most likely to identify individuals who should be
subject to additional scrutiny.  People will not know whether they
have been so identified.  Nevertheless, people might avoid calling cer-
tain groups for fear that they will wind up on a watch list or suspicious
persons list.  The problem is that the consequences in this case are
unclear, as the government has not yet indicated what precisely it
intends to do with the information.  Under existing doctrine, estab-
lishing a chilling effect would likely be difficult.
In this case, overbreadth doctrine might provide the appropriate
protection.  Without more information about what groups the govern-
ment is targeting, it is hard for any individual or group to bring a
direct challenge to the information gathering.  Any given person
might have no idea whether the government is analyzing her associa-
tions or what precisely the government is doing with the data.
Because the NSA’s information gathering program is extremely broad
and could capture a wide range of associational activity, an individual
could bring an overbreadth challenge without being required to show
that he personally has been chilled.
305 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
306 Id. at 622.
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4. Obtaining Financial Records
In United States v. Miller,307 which established the third-party
doctrine, the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not
apply to the subpoena at issue because individuals have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in financial records held by financial institu-
tions.308  In a footnote, the Court explicitly left open the question of
whether the First Amendment might limit subpoenas for financial
records, noting that the respondent did “not contend that the sub-
poenas infringed upon his First Amendment rights.”309  Moreover, the
Court noted that “[t]here was no blanket reporting requirement . . .
nor any allegation of an improper inquiry into protected associational
activities.”310
To what extent should the First Amendment protect financial
records?  Although financial records can reveal much activity that
falls outside the scope of the First Amendment—such as fraud, con-
spiracy, embezzlement, money laundering, and other crimes—they
can also reveal political associations.  A few years before Miller, when
the Supreme Court decided California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz,311
many Justices recognized that disclosure of bank records to the gov-
ernment might implicate freedom of association. Shultz involved a
blanket reporting requirement, under the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970,
which compels banks to provide information about people’s financial
transactions to the government.312  A group of bankers and a group of
account holders challenged the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy
Act.  The primary purpose of the Act was to make it easier to detect
fraud and other forms of white collar crime.313  Under regulations to
implement the Act, all international transactions exceeding $5000,314
as well as domestic transactions exceeding $10,000,315 had to be
reported to the government.  The Court held that the bankers did not
have Fourth Amendment rights in the data because “corporations can
claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to pri-
307 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
308 Id. at 442–43.
309 Id. at 444 n.6.  For a discussion of how the third-party doctrine cases might be more
narrowly interpreted, see the sources cited in note 302, supra.
310 Miller, 425 U.S. at 444 n.6. (citation omitted).
311 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
312 Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 101–102, 84 Stat. 1114 (current
version at 12 U.S.C. § 1829(b) (2000)).
313 See H. JEFF SMITH, MANAGING PRIVACY 24 (1994) (stating that trend toward reduc-
tion in paper records in banking industry made criminal investigations more difficult,
leading to adoption of Bank Secrecy Act).
314 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 (1974); see also id. § 103.25 (listing information subject to
reporting requirements).
315 Id. § 103.22.
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vacy.”316  The account holders failed to allege that they engaged in
transactions exceeding $10,000, and as a result, lacked standing.317
The Court further rejected a Fifth Amendment challenge, concluding
that the bankers lacked “standing to assert Fifth Amendment claims
on behalf of customers in general” and that the account holders failed
to allege that “any of the information required by the Secretary will
tend to incriminate them.”318
The Court also addressed a First Amendment challenge by the
ACLU, which claimed that the reporting requirements infringed upon
its right to freedom of association.319  However, the Court found that
the ACLU failed to allege that it engaged in the kinds of financial
transactions that would be subject to reporting and therefore lacked
standing.320
Nonetheless, concurring and dissenting opinions noted that
reporting requirements could infringe on First Amendment freedoms.
In a concurrence, Justices Powell and Blackmun observed that the
scope of the Act was limited by the reporting requirements, which
only required reporting of transactions over particular amounts.321
They then noted, however, that “[a] significant extension of the regu-
lations’ reporting requirements . . . would pose substantial and diffi-
cult constitutional questions . . . . Financial transactions can reveal
much about a person’s activities, associations, and beliefs.”322  Justice
Douglas in dissent argued that “banking transactions of an individual
give a fairly accurate account of his religion, ideology, opinions, and
interests.”323  Justices Brennan and Marshall also noted that First
Amendment rights were potentially implicated.324  Thus in both Miller
and Shultz, several Justices acknowledged that First Amendment
activities could be implicated by the collection of financial records, but
the Court nonetheless managed to avoid squarely addressing the
issue.
If the issue were properly before the Court, would the First
Amendment be implicated?  Suppose the government were to sub-
316 Cal. Bankers, 416 U.S. at 65 (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,
652 (1950)).
317 Id. at 67–68.
318 Id. at 71–73.
319 Id. at 75–76.
320 Id. at 76 (“Until there is some showing that the reporting requirements contained in
the Secretary’s regulations would require the reporting of information with respect to the
organization’s financial activities, no concrete controversy is presented to this Court for
adjudication.”).
321 Id. at 78–79 (Powell, J., concurring and joined by Blackmun, J.).
322 Id. at 78.
323 Id. at 85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
324 Id. at 93 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 97–99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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poena the bank account records of the hypothetical Terrorist Sympa-
thizers Association, discussed earlier, because it suspects that the
group might be furnishing financial assistance to terrorists and wants
to investigate contributors to the group.  This investigation would be
an “inquiry into protected associational activities” that fall within the
boundaries of the First Amendment.325  Providing donations is an
essential part of freedom of association.  As the Court noted in
Buckley v. Valeo,326 “The right to join together ‘for the advancement
of beliefs and ideas’ . . . is diluted if it does not include the right to
pool money through contributions, for funds are often essential if
advocacy is to be truly or optimally effective.”327  As David Cole
argues, “Groups cannot exist without the material support of their
members and associates.  If the right of association meant only that
one had the right to join organizations but not to support them, the
right would be empty.”328  The government’s criminal investigation
could ultimately have a chilling effect and inhibit people from
donating money to controversial groups.
In several cases, federal circuit courts have held that subpoenas to
banks for the account records of political groups trigger First Amend-
ment scrutiny.329  For example, in First National Bank v. United
States,330 the court held that a grand jury subpoena for bank account
records of antitaxation groups implicated the First Amendment
because “the constitutionally protected right, freedom to associate
freely and anonymously, will be chilled equally whether the associa-
tional information is compelled from the organization itself or from
third parties.”331  Because the activities affected fall within the bound-
aries of the First Amendment and a chilling effect is likely, I would
argue that the First Amendment should regulate the government
investigation of the Terrorist Sympathizers Association.
325 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 n.6  (1976).
326 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
327 Id. at 65–66 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460
(1958)).
328 Cole, New McCarthyism, supra note 167, at 11.
329 See, e.g., Local 1814 v. Waterfront Comm’n, 667 F.2d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 1981) (con-
cluding that subpoena for contributors to Fund violated First Amendment because “com-
pelled disclosure of the Fund’s contributors under the circumstances of this case would
give rise to a chilling effect similar to the one recognized by the Supreme Court in Shelton
v. Tucker”); United States v. Citizens State Bank, 612 F.2d 1091, 1094 (8th Cir. 1980)
(finding that antitax group’s allegation that subpoena on bank for account records caused
“adverse effects” on its “organizational and fundraising activities” was sufficient to estab-
lish “a prima facie showing of arguable First Amendment infringement”).
330 701 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1983).
331 Id. at 118.
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Suppose instead that the government subpoenaed the bank
records of John Doe, whom it suspected of engaging in money laun-
dering for a drug cartel.  Criminal liability for money laundering is
disconnected from Doe’s political associations.  Although the infor-
mation gathering has the potential to cause some chilling, the limited
purpose and scope of the investigation minimize the likelihood of a
chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights.  In contrast,
the Terrorist Sympathizers Association example involves potential
criminal liability in connection with the expressive associational activi-
ties of that group.
A final question worth examining is whether the Bank Secrecy
Act of 1970 is constitutional under the First Amendment.  Its purpose
is to gather evidence about criminal activity, so it does not appear to
be directed toward First Amendment activities.  Its effect, however,
poses a risk of chilling many legitimate financial transactions involving
political groups.  Because of its great breadth and lack of procedures
to prevent the government from using it to ferret out information
about group membership, the Act presents a much greater threat of
chilling effect than a targeted inquiry would.
A finding that the First Amendment applies would not necessa-
rily invalidate the Act.  Instead, one would analyze whether the gov-
ernment interest justifying the Bank Secrecy Act is substantial and
whether the Act is appropriately tailored to achieve that government
interest.  Ferreting out crime would clearly be a substantial govern-
ment interest.  The Court would then look to whether the law does so
in an appropriately tailored manner so as not to unduly compromise
First Amendment freedoms.  I believe that this analysis as applied to
the Bank Secrecy Act would be a difficult and contestable one.  It
would examine whether the government could achieve its goals with
more narrowly tailored means.  Such an analysis involves matters of
white collar criminal investigation that are beyond the scope of this
Article, but it is worth noting that such an analysis can and should
take place.
An individual might also attack the Bank Secrecy Act under the
overbreadth prong of my analysis.  As Justice Douglas noted in dis-
sent in Shultz, “making [financial transactions] automatically available
to all federal investigative agencies is a sledge-hammer approach to a
problem that only a delicate scalpel can manage.”332  While the Act
might further substantial government interests in detecting unlawful
financial activity, it also sweeps in a significant amount of lawful finan-
332 Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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cial activity that is related to expressive associations.  The Act might
therefore be overbroad under the First Amendment.
5. Questioning a Person’s Friends
Suppose the police are investigating John Doe for a hate crime.
They interview Doe’s friends to find out if he said anything to them
about his attitudes toward minorities.  Such interviews might indeed
have a chilling effect on Doe’s associational activities.  However, even
if the First Amendment were implicated, a warrant with probable
cause would be too stringent a standard.  Requiring a warrant with
probable cause for instances when people talk voluntarily to govern-
ment officials would restrict a large range of investigative activity.
Under Fourth Amendment law, there are exceptions to the warrant
and probable cause requirements when they are impractical.333  In
these cases, the courts engage in a general balancing, weighing the
invasiveness of a particular government practice against the govern-
ment’s need for the information.334
A rule requiring a warrant whenever law enforcement officials
spoke to a person about a suspect would be extremely cumbersome.
Police could not talk to witnesses of crimes—or even victims—without
first getting a warrant.  The voluntary nature of the dialogue between
the government and the individuals makes the information gathering
much less problematic than coerced forms of information gathering,
such as subpoenas or National Security Letters or even surveillance.
The First Amendment would simply require that the information
gathering be voluntary.  Gathering information from other individuals
who voluntarily supply it would be sufficiently narrowly tailored to
achieve the government’s significant interest in investigating a crime.
Such an approach is not perfect, as there may be some instances
where people’s conversations with others will be chilled.  But a rule
requiring a warrant with probable cause whenever the government
speaks to a person about conversations with another would simply be
too impractical, making many law enforcement investigations impos-
sible without providing substantial benefits in terms of First Amend-
ment protection.
If instead of seeking information voluntarily, the government
were to issue a subpoena compelling witnesses to testify about
333 One example is when the police use random checkpoints, such as fixed sobriety
checkpoints for drivers.  Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
334 See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004) (“[I]n judging reasonableness, we
look to the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the
seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual
liberty.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
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another person’s First Amendment activity, the First Amendment
would require a higher procedural threshold, such as a warrant with
probable cause or a subpoena with heightened standards (perhaps
probable cause rather than relevance).
CONCLUSION
For far too long, courts and commentators have viewed the First
Amendment as irrelevant to criminal procedure.  But as Fourth and
Fifth Amendment protections recede from those areas where First
Amendment activity is most likely to occur, it is time to look to the
First Amendment for protection.  Perhaps more so than any other
amendment in the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment has iconic
status, and it has grown massively in power and scope over the past
century.  Unlike the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the First Amend-
ment shows no sign of weakening.  In this Article, I have demon-
strated that First Amendment criminal procedure is both justified and
necessary to prevent the infringement of First Amendment rights in
the course of government investigations.  It is time for the First
Amendment to take its place alongside the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments as a source of constitutional criminal procedure.
